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Abstract: This paper provides empirical evidence on the causal effects that upgrading slum 
dwellings has on the living conditions of the extremely poor. In particular, we study the impact 
of providing better houses in situ to slum dwellers in El Salvador, Mexico and Uruguay. We 
experimentally evaluate the impact of a housing project run by the NGO TECHO which provides 
basic pre-fabricated houses to members of extremely poor population groups in Latin America. 
The main objective of the program is to improve household well-being. Our findings show that 
better houses have a positive effect on overall housing conditions and general well-being: 
treated households are happier with their quality of life. In two countries, we also document 
improvements in children’s health; in El Salvador, slum dwellers also feel that they are safer. 
We do not find this result, however, in the other two experimental samples. There are no other 
noticeable robust effects on the possession of durable goods or in terms of labor outcomes. 
Our results are robust in terms of both internal and external validity because they are derived 
from similar experiments in three different Latin American countries.  
JEL: I12, I31, J13, O15, O18 
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1. Introduction  
The 1948 United Nation Universal Declaration of Human Rights identified housing, along with 
food and clothing, as a basic requirement for achieving an adequate standard of living.1 Despite 
this, almost one billion people, primarily in the developing world, live in urban slums and lack 
proper housing (United Nations, 2003).2 Most slum dwellers live in houses with dirt floors, 
poor-quality roofs, and walls constructed out of waste materials such as cardboard, tin and 
plastic. These houses do not provide proper protection against inclement weather, are not 
secure and are not pleasant to live in. Many have insufficient access to services such as clean 
water, sanitation and electricity (UN-Habitat, 2003 and Marx et al., 2013). 
Housing is one of the largest expenditures that a family makes and it a superior good, inasmuch 
as the share of income spent on housing typically increases disproportionately as income rises.  
Adequate housing provides a number of benefits. First, families live and spend a large amount 
of time in their houses. Houses are one of the few places that families can use for rest and 
relaxation. As such, housing quality contributes substantially to well-being, quality of life and 
mental health. A proper house can induce a sense of dignity and pride (Sen, 1999). In fact, 
Cattaneo et al. (2009) and Devoto et al. (2011) have shown how specific housing improvements 
such as better floors and access to water have resulted in increased satisfaction with quality of 
life and better mental health. Second, adequate housing can promote physical health by 
providing protection against the ravages of the environment. Roofs and walls shelter one from 
rain and from the cold. Water, sanitation and non-dirt floors protect against parasitic 
infestations and infections. Finally, housing may provide security and serve as a defense against 
crime, a major problem in slums (United Nations, 2003). Thus, proper housing may allow 
households to accumulate assets, as well as free up time for use in more productive activities 
that would otherwise be devoted to protecting assets.  
                                                          
1 United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 25 (1948). 
2 In line with previous work, we define a slum as an overcrowded settlement which has poor-quality 
housing, inadequate access to safe water and sanitation, and insecurity of tenure (UN-Habitat, 2003).  
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This paper provides some of the first experimental evidence regarding the causal effects of 
upgrading dwellings on the living conditions of extremely poor persons in slums. We examine 
the impact of inexpensive but sturdy houses constructed by TECHO, an NGO that provides basic 
pre-fabricated houses to extremely poor populations in Latin America. TECHO targets the 
poorest informal settlements and, within these settlements, the families who live in extremely 
substandard housing. TECHO houses are a significant improvement over existing housing units 
in terms of their flooring, roofs and walls. While the TECHO houses are substantial 
improvement over the pre-existing dwellings, they do not have indoor sanitation facilities, 
running water or kitchens.  
In this paper, we use experimentally generated variation to assess the effects of upgraded 
housing on living conditions in three Latin American countries: El Salvador, Mexico and 
Uruguay. Our findings show that the better structures have a positive effect on overall housing 
conditions and general well-being: treated households are happier and more satisfied with the 
quality of their lives. This is a dimension of social policy that is often overlooked but is crucial to 
the “life experience” of poor people and, thus, should be taken into account whenever 
evaluating housing programs like TECHO. In two countries, El Salvador and Mexico, we also 
document improvements in children’s health, while, in El Salvador, slum dwellers’ perception of 
their safety and security also improves. There are, however, no robust noticeable effects on the 
possession of durable goods or in terms of employment outcomes.  
Any causal study must overcome both internal and external threats to its validity (see Campbell, 
1957, and Cook and Campbell, 1979). Most research is focused on addressing threats to 
internal validity; i.e., on ensuring that the estimated effects are “causal” within the context of 
the study population. External validity, in contrast, refers to the extent to which the estimated 
effects can be applied to other populations in different settings and at different times. 
Ultimately, external validity is established by replication in multiple data sets drawn from a 
variety of settings (Angrist, 2004).3 Our results are unusually robust in terms of both internal 
and external validity because they are derived from experiments in three different Latin 
                                                          
3 See Cruces and Galiani (2007) for an application of this idea in the context of a quasi-experiment on 
the effect of fertility on maternal labor supply.   
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American countries and we are therefore able to identify casual results that are robust across 
countries.4  
Despite the importance of housing, however, very little evidence exists on the causal effects of 
housing programs. Our findings constitute a contribution to the small body of literature on this 
subject.5 To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first randomized experiment 
undertaken to assess the impact of upgrading housing infrastructure in slums in the developing 
world.6 Previous contributions include Katz et al. (2001), who analyzed the results of a program 
that randomly offered vouchers to poor slum dwellers in the U.S. that allowed them to relocate 
to areas with lower poverty rates. Voucher recipients experienced improvements in some 
indicators of well-being, including safety, health and the prevalence of behavioral problems 
among boys. Kling et al. (2004) exploited the same experiment and found a reduction in arrests 
of young people for violent crimes and of young females for property crimes, but also found 
increased behavioral problems and property crime in the case of young males. Cattaneo et al. 
(2009) exploited a natural experiment that showed that replacing dirt floors with cement floors 
in urban areas of Mexico has a positive impact on child health, maternal mental health, and 
satisfaction with quality of life. Finally, Devoto et al. (2011) studied the effects of randomly 
offering credit to finance household connections to the water distribution system in urban 
Morocco. While they do not find significant health effects, they do find a significant 
improvement in self-reported well-being.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the intervention. Section 
3 presents the experimental design. In Section 4 we introduce the econometric methods used 
                                                          
4 While external validity is evaluated in terms of the direction and statistical significance of the effects of 
the intervention, the size of the effects could well be different across settings because the 
counterfactuals might also differ across settings.  
5 See Marx et al. (2013) for a  survey on the economics of slums, Jaitman (2012) for a literature review 
on slum upgrading programs, and Duflo et al. (2012a) on urban services. 
6 There are also a large number of cross-sectional observational studies that point to the existence of 
strong associations between poor housing and indicators of poor health (see Thomson et al., 2001, for a 
review).  
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in this study, while in section 5 we present our empirical results. In section 6 we discuss who 
lives in slums and offer some insights on the formation of slums. Finally, section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Upgrading Housing Infrastructure   
TECHO provides basic pre-fabricated houses to extremely poor families living informal 
settlements (slums) in Latin America with the objective of improving well-being. It started up 
seventeen years ago in Chile and now works in 19 Latin American countries. The NGO has built 
almost 100,000 houses with the help of an army of volunteers. Every year more than 20,000 
youth throughout Latin America volunteer to work with TECHO.7 
The locations of the settlements in El Salvador are somewhat different than in the other 2 
countries. In El Salvador TECHO works in poor areas scattered throughout the country, but 
excludes the primary urban center of San Salvador. In contrast, the TECHO intervention sites 
are concentrated closer to largest urban centers in the other two countries. In Mexico, this 
includes slums in Estado de Mexico located adjacent to Mexico City, and in Uruguay, slums 
located in and around Montevideo and Canelones.  
TECHO targets the poorest informal settlements and the households within these settlements 
that live in very substandard dwellings. TECHO serves “irregular settlements,” defined as 
communities comprised of families that inhabit plots of land that they do not own. Settlements 
are plagued by a host of problems such as insufficient access to basic services (water, electricity 
and sanitation), significant levels of soil and water contamination, and overcrowding. The 
typical housing units in these informal settlements are no better than their surroundings, as 
                                                          
7 While the work primarily involves building homes, over 3,500 regular volunteers also commit at least 
one day a week to community organization and participating in social inclusion programs. This second 
phase of the intervention aims at developing skills through the implementation of these inclusive 
programs. Our study focuses on evaluating the impact of the first phase of the program: the 
construction of transitional housing. We limit the evaluation sample frame to settlements that did not 
receive the services provided during the second phase of the intervention so that no intervention other 
than the construction of housing took place in the settlements studied during the period of analysis.    
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they are rudimentary units constructed from discarded materials such as cardboard, tin and 
plastic, have dirt floors and lack connections to basic services such as water and sewer systems.   
The TECHO housing units are 18 squared meters (6m by 3m) in size. The walls are made of pre-
fabricated, insulated pinewood panels or aluminum and the roofs are made of tin to keep 
occupants warm and protect them from humidity, insects, and rain.8  Floors are built on top of 
15 stacks that raise it up to between 30 and 80 centimeters off the ground in order to reduce 
dampness and protect occupants from floods and infestations. Although these houses are a 
major improvement over the recipients’ previous housing situation, the facilities they offer are 
limited, as they do not include a bathroom or kitchen or amenities such as plumbing, drinking 
water hook-ups, or gas connections.   
The houses are designed to be low cost and easy to construct. Units are modular and portable, 
are constructed with simple tools, and are set up by volunteers working in squads of 4-8 
members. The cost of a Techo house is less than $1,000, of which the beneficiary family 
contributes 10%. In El Salvador, this is approximately equivalent to 3 months’ earnings, while in 
Mexico and Uruguay, it is roughly equivalent to 1.4 months. The following images show 
examples of the TECHO houses built in El Salvador, Mexico and Uruguay.  
 
  
El Salvador Mexico and Uruguay 
 
                                                          
8
 In El Salvador, floors are made of cement, and walls and roofs are made of aluminum. In Mexico and 
Uruguay, floors and walls are made of wood, while roofs are made of aluminum.  
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The houses are also easy to disassemble and move to a new location. It is important for the 
houses to be movable because most of the families in these makeshift settlements do not have 
formal title to the land that they live on. TECHO managers were concerned that upgrading the 
value of the land by building permanent housing might induce both public and private owners 
to try to force residents to move in order to reclaim the improved land. However, by making 
the housing mobile, there is no such incentive.9 
   
3. Experimental Design  
TECHO budget and personnel constraints limit the number of housing units that can be built at 
any one time.10 Under these constraints, TECHO opted to select beneficiaries through a lottery 
system giving all eligible households in a pre-determined geographical neighborhood an equal 
opportunity to receive the housing upgrade in a given year. We exploit this experimental 
variability to assess the impact of improved housing living conditions.  
TECHO first selected a set of eligible settlements and then conducted a census to identify 
eligible households (i.e., those poor enough to be given priority). The eligible households were 
then randomly assigned to treatment and control groups. Since TECHO did not have the 
capacity to work in all settlements at once, the program was rolled out in each country in two 
phases.11 Random assignment was performed within each settlement on a rolling basis.12, 13 
                                                          
9 A more comprehensive slum upgrading program would likely be preceded by a land titling program 
(see, among others, Field, 2005, and Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2010). 
10 This also constrained the size of the sample used in our study in each country. 
11  See Supplemental Appendix Table A1 for the dates of each phase and follow-up survey in each 
country. 
12 In El Salvador and Uruguay, some settlements were randomly assigned a higher intensity-of-treatment 
level. However, due to the small number of clusters, mostly, we do not exploit this feature in our 
analysis.  
13 Within each settlement every household had the same probability of being chosen for inclusion in the 
intention-to-treat group, but this was not necessarily the case across settlements.  
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Baseline surveys were conducted approximately one month before the start of each phase, and 
the follow-up surveys were between 19 and 29 months after construction (See Supplemental 
Appendix Table A1). In order to obtain truthful information from households and to avoid 
creating any desirability bias in the treatment group, the data collection was separated from 
the implementation of the intervention by contracting a highly respected survey firm in each 
country. The enumerators identified themselves as collecting data for a study on living 
conditions and did not make any reference to TECHO verbally or in written form. All surveys 
included modules on socioeconomic characteristics, the labor market, assets, security, health 
and self-reported measures of satisfaction. (Supplemental Appendix tables A2a, A2b, and A2c 
provide details on the variables in the analyses).   
Our sample includes 23 settlements in El Salvador, 39 settlements in Mexico and 12 in Uruguay.  
The total number of eligible households in these settlements was 2,373 split approximately 
evenly across the 3 countries. Treatment was offered to 60% of the households in El Salvador, 
51% in Mexico and 61% in Uruguay (See Supplemental Appendix Table A3).14 In all, over 85% of 
the households in the intention-to-treat groups complied with the treatment assignment, while 
the compliance rates for the non-intention-to-treat groups were practically perfect. Finally, we 
attempted to track all of households that migrated out of the study settlements, but could find 
and interview only a fraction of them.  Attrition rates from the sample are between 5.5% and 
7% of households in the intention-to-treat group and 6.3% to 8.7% of those in the non-
intention-to-treat group. Though the attrition rates are about one percentage point higher in 
the non-intention-to-treat group in all three countries, the differences are not statistically 
significant at conventional levels. 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 Note, however, that the number of individuals, as measured in the follow-up survey, increased in 
almost all groups and samples. Among the households interviewed in the follow up survey, a large 
fraction of the new members are children below 2 years old. The rest is mainly account by other children 
of the head of the household not present at the house at the time we collected the respective baseline 
survey.     
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3.1. Experimental Group Balance 
Under randomization, the outcomes of the intention- and non-intention-to-treat groups should 
be equal, on average, prior to treatment. In Supplemental Appendix Tables A4a and A4b, we 
present summary statistics separately for the intention- and non-intention-to-treat groups on a 
large set of pre-treatment variables grouped as socioeconomic characteristics, housing 
characteristics, assets, satisfaction with quality of housing and life, security, education and 
health. We also report robust standard errors and test for the null hypothesis of no difference 
between the mean values of each variable for each experimental group. Given that the 
randomization of units between experimental groups occurred within each settlement, we 
expect them to be well-balanced once we control for settlement fixed effects. Thus, when 
testing the null hypothesis of no differences between the two groups, we control by settlement 
fixed effects.   
The analysis indicates that the design is well balanced, since, in Mexico and El Salvador, only 2 
out of 44 variables are unbalanced at the 10% significance level, while, in Uruguay, six variables 
appear to be unbalanced at conventional levels. Finally, in the combined three experiments, 
only 4 out of 44 variables are statistically different between groups at conventional levels. This 
is about what would be expected by chance. 15,16  
3.2. Baseline Cross-Country Housing Differences  
A major strength of this study is that it provides an evaluation of the same intervention in three 
different populations and environments. Mexico and Uruguay are much richer than El Salvador. 
The PPP Gross National Income (GNI) per capita in 2007 was USD 12,580 in Mexico, USD 11,020 
                                                          
15 The analysis remains almost unchanged if we instead cluster the standard errors at the settlement 
level while still including settlement fixed effects. We find only three variables unbalanced in El Salvador, 
four in Mexico and Uruguay, and only three variables in the combined three experimental samples. 
These results are available upon request.  
16 Without controlling for settlement fixed effects, we find that, in Uruguay, only two variables appear to 
be statistically unbalanced; in Mexico, six variables are unbalanced, but in El Salvador as many as eight 
variables are unbalanced at the 10% level of statistical significance. Overall, in the combined three 
samples, six variables are unbalanced at conventional levels of statistical significance. These results are 
available upon request.  
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in Uruguay compared to USD 5,640 in El Salvador. These differences are reflected in housing 
and as such influence the estimated impacts of dwelling upgrades on outcomes. Therefore, a 
comparison of the baseline housing characteristics is an important input for the interpretation 
of our results as these provide the counterfactuals estimates for the treatment effects.  
In Table A5, we highlight a set of 11 housing characteristics measured at baseline in all of the 
countries and test the null hypothesis of no difference between the mean values of each 
variable by country. Baseline housing was, as is to be expected, substantially better in Mexico 
and Uruguay than in El Salvador. For example, in Mexico 64.9% of households had high-quality 
floors, while in Uruguay the corresponding figure was 37.2% and in El Salvador it was only 
14.4%. In Uruguay and Mexico, a large percentage of households had electricity (95.9% and 
83.8%, respectively) and some form of water connection (91.3% and 51.0%, respectively), 
while, in El Salvador, only 39.1% of households had electricity and 21.5% of them had some sort 
of water hook-up on the property.   
 
4. Methods 
We report estimates of the average intention-to-treat effect for the outcomes of interest. Given 
the high compliance rate, these parameters are very close to average treatment effects. 
Operationally, we estimate the following regression model: 
 
   (1) 
 
where i indexes households or individuals, j indexes settlements, Yij is any of the outcomes 
under study, and   is the parameter of interest (i.e., the coefficient associated to a dummy 
variable that equals 1 for the households or individuals that were experimentally allocated to 
treatment, and 0 otherwise) on the outcome under consideration,17 Xij is a vector of pre-
                                                          
17 Some of the variables under study are limited dependent variables (LDVs). The problem posed by 
causal inference with LDVs is not fundamentally different from the problem of causal inference with 
ijjijijij   X Treat toIntention  Y
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treatment characteristics measured at baseline, μj is a settlement fixed effect, and ij is the 
error term. The settlement fixed effects capture the average unobservable differences across 
settlements that may exist given that randomization was conducted within each settlement. 
Controlling for settlement fixed effects, we assume that the error terms are independent and 
report only robust standard errors throughout the empirical section of the analysis.18 
In studies with multiple outcomes, statistically significant effects may emerge simply by chance. 
The larger the number of tests, the higher is the likelihood of incurring in a type I error. We 
correct for this possibility by using Bonferroni Family-Wise Error Rates (FWER) to adjust the p-
values of the individual tests as a function of the number of outcome variables. We compute 
Bonferroni FWER corrections at the 10 percent level of statistical significance by dividing the 
desired size of the test by the number of outcome variables in conceptually similar blocks of 
outcomes grouped by table and country experiment.  
We also follow Kling et al. (2007) to construct summary indexes by family group. We first 
impute missing values using the mean of the settlement by intention-to-treat status. Then, we 
standardize each outcome variable by subtracting the mean value of the control group and by 
dividing by its standard deviation. Finally, the summary index is computed as the sum of 
standardized outcome variables in the group with the sign of each measure oriented so that 
more beneficial outcomes have higher scores divided by the number of outcome variables. 
These summary indexes, aggregating information across related outcomes, are not only useful 
summary statistics but might also improve the statistical power to detect effects of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
continuous outcomes. If there are no covariates or the covariates are sparse and discrete, linear models 
are no less appropriate for LDVs than for other types of dependent variables. This is certainly the case in 
a randomized control trial where controls are included only in order to improve efficiency, but their 
omission would not bias the estimates of the parameters of interest. 
18 The statistical inference of the results reported in the next section are robust to clustering the 
standard errors at the settlement level in that rejection decisions of the null hypothesis of no effect 
remain the same at conventional levels of statistical significance. This result renders credibility to our 
assumption that the settlement fixed effect captures the systematic unobserved differences across 
slums. These results are available upon request.  
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intervention that are consistent across groups of outcomes when they have idiosyncratic 
variation. 
Finally, standard statistical corrections to attempt to control the type-I error rate of a test, such 
as the Bonferroni correction, are more important in the context of an experiment where there 
is little other information used in the analysis than the one about the randomization of 
treatment status. Our study departs from that paradigm in that it reports effects of three 
independent samples and hence, we can rely on the information of these independent samples 
to reassure ourselves of the validity of our inference. In that sense, in the next section, we will 
tend to emphasize more the sets of results that we obtain in all three samples.  
 
5.  Results 
In this section we report the estimated effects of TECHO houses on several outcome variables 
of interest, including dwelling quality, satisfaction with the house and quality of life, security, 
assets, labor supply and child health. We report the results of estimating equation (1) for two 
different specifications –one with and one without a set of control variables that are listed in 
the notes to the tables.  In each table, we first present the results for Models 1 and 2 for each 
country separately and then present the estimates for the parameter of interest in these two 
models for a pooled sample that includes the three experiments. These estimates provide an 
informative “average” summary of the results across all 3 countries and also are likely to be 
more precisely estimated. At the bottom of each table we report the effect on the aggregated 
summary index for all indicators. Finally, we still report conventional significance levels in the 
traditional manner in the tables and the corresponding Bonferroni FWER adjusted p-value for 
each group in the table notes.   
 5.1 Housing 
We begin by first demonstrating that the provision of a TECHO house had an impact on the 
quality of housing. This is a necessary condition in order for this intervention to have any 
impact on the other outcomes. In addition, we test whether families invested further in their 
13 
 
house. Better houses may also provide incentives to invest in further housing improvements, 
since such investments may be associated with other complementarities (see, among others, 
Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). Generally, we find that TECHO has had a large positive effect on the 
quality of housing but no more than that.  
In Table 1a we present the results for the effects of the program on housing quality. As 
expected, the program resulted in substantial improvements in the quality of floors, walls and 
roofs, as well as in the percentage of rooms with windows. TECHO substantially improved 
overall housing as reflected in the program effect on the housing quality summary index. Since 
baseline housing conditions were worse in El Salvador than in Uruguay and Mexico, the 
program’s absolute effects are consistently larger in the first case than in the others. Still, in all 
cases the effects are large both in absolute and in relative terms. All the estimated effects but 
those for number of rooms remain significant after adjusting the p-values for multiple 
outcomes. Nevertheless, the increase in the number of rooms remains statistically significant in 
the case of Mexico and also in the combined analysis across the three experiments.  
In Table 1b we investigate whether the improvement in the house as a result of the 
intervention triggered further investments by the beneficiary families. We find that the 
program did not induce positive significant complementary investments among beneficiaries. In 
particular, there are no positive effects on access to water, electricity or sanitation. If anything, 
we find that two out of the five outcomes studied are negatively affected in the case Mexico at 
conventional levels of statistical significance. In one case, significance is lost when contrasted 
with the Bonferroni adjusted p-values. These results are consistent with households not holding 
land titles and hence lacking incentives to invest. 
 5.2 Satisfaction with house and quality of life 
Table 2 presents the program’s effects on ordinal self-reported measures of satisfaction with 
the housing unit as well as with an overall self-reported measure of quality of life. In all 
countries, all measures substantially increased. Families are happier with their houses and with 
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their lives.19 The gains are substantially larger in El Salvador20 than in Mexico and Uruguay, 
which is consistent with the fact that the improvement in housing conditions is greater in the 
first case than in the other two.21 The index that measures satisfaction with the quality of 
floors, for example, is over 200% higher in households in the treatment group with respect to 
the control group in El Salvador, while in Mexico the index is around 20% higher in the 
intention-to-treat households than in the control-group households, and in Uruguay the 
differential is around 39%. Similarly, satisfaction with quality of life is 41% higher in the 
intention-to-treat households in El Salvador, while in Mexico the figure is around 28% and in 
Uruguay it is around 21%. 
5.3 Security and safety 
Security is one of the most important concerns of urban slum dwellers. Information from our 
baseline survey shows that overall 38% of the heads of household often or always felt unsafe 
and 54% felt unsafe when leaving their homes alone. In this sense, it could be argued that 
providing a better house could potentially make people feel safer. 
In Table 3 we present the results of the program in terms of several measures of security 
related to housing. We report the effect of the program on the perception of security: whether 
people feel safe inside the house, whether they feel that it is safe to leave the house alone, 
whether it seems safe to leave children alone in the house and whether the house has been 
burglarized. All the questions refer to the preceding year. Our estimations show that, in El 
Salvador, all self-reported measures of security improve substantially. The increase in the index 
                                                          
19 In order to interpret better these results, it is important to note that for all variables considered in this 
section and all experimental samples, the average outcome for the control group never decreased 
between the baseline and treatment measures.   
20 Due to a problem with data collection in the follow-up survey in El Salvador, non-response to this 
question was differentially larger for the control group. Thus, to be on the safe side, we impute a value 
equal to 1 ("satisfied with quality of life") to 84 missing values in control group observations, which 
reduces the non-response rate for this variable from 43% to 7%, the same as in the intention-to-treat 
group. Without performing this imputation, the coefficient is 0.479 for Model 1 and 0.480 for Model 2. 
   
21 Qualitatively, the results of this section are robust to the estimation of an ordered Probit model. The 
probability of being in the highest (or second highest) satisfaction category always increases with 
treatment and the marginal effect is always statistically significant at conventional levels. These results 
are available upon request.  
 
15 
 
for security inside the house is around 27% and the improvement is about 57% in the index that 
measures whether it is safe to leave children alone, but no such effect is detected in Uruguay or 
Mexico. We do not find that the program has any effect on crime, however, as there are no 
statistically significant reported changes in the frequency of burglaries during the past year in 
any of the three countries; it is also true, however, that, in El Salvador and Mexico, burglary 
rates in the settlements in our sample were very low and hence the exercise is not very 
informative.  
 5.4 Possession of durable goods 
There are different ways in which housing conditions can influence the possession of durable 
goods. On the one hand, if a better house provides security to those who live in it, then it will 
also provide more security for the assets inside it. Thus, dwellers can invest more in buying 
durable goods. On the other hand, having an improved house can also increase the valuation of 
some durable goods and, thus, stimulate their acquisition. 
Table 4 depicts the performance of different variables corresponding to the possession of 
assets. We estimate the effect of the program on the possession of TV sets, fans, gas stoves, 
refrigerators and bicycles. The results show, however, that the program has had no effect on 
the possession of any of these assets. In other words, at least during the period studied, we do 
not find that the treated households have responded to the investment in their houses by 
increasing their own investments in supplementary durable goods. 
 5.5 Household Structure and Labor Outcomes  
In this subsection we present the results of our analysis with respect to household structure 
and labor outcomes. We first estimate whether the improved housing has had any effect on the 
number of members residing in each house and find no statistically significant effects on this 
front. We also investigate whether, in this limited period of time, there has been any effect on 
fertility by estimating whether the treatment has influenced the number of newborns in the 
housing units, but, here again, we do not identify any significant effects (see Table 5a).22  
                                                          
22 In Uruguay, and only for model 2, the number of newborns in the last two years is statistically 
significant at conventional levels but the significance disappears once the test is contrasted against the 
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We then estimate whether the improved housing, either directly or indirectly, stimulates labor 
supply and earnings (in particular, the income per capita of the household and whether either 
the head of household or the spouse works more). As can be seen from the tables, we do not 
detect significant effects on any of these outcomes. We can conclude that better housing, at 
least in the way that it is provided by the TECHO program, has no effect on the labor outcomes 
of the treated households (see Table 5b).23 
 5.6 Child Health 
The reasons why better housing can lead to an improvement in the health of the persons living 
in those houses are clear. For instance, dirt floors generally pose a serious threat to children’s 
health. In the study carried out by Cattaneo et al. (2009) concerning the replacement of dirt 
floors with cement floors, the authors found a statistically significant reduction in the incidence 
of parasitic infections, diarrhea and the prevalence of anemia. Another way in which housing 
improvements can support health is the reduction in indoor air pollution. Duflo et al. (2012b) 
have shown that improper ventilation of houses and the use of substandard kitchen stoves can 
have significantly negative effects on respiratory –and even general- health. The houses 
provided by the TECHO program provide better ventilation than most of the slum dwellings do 
and may therefore have a positive effect on overall health as well.   
In Table 6 we test whether the upgraded houses result in an improvement in child health; the 
indicators used for this purpose are the prevalence of diarrhea and of respiratory disease. The 
estimated coefficients are mainly negative in both El Salvador and Mexico, suggesting that 
there may have been a decrease in the prevalence of those illnesses due to the intervention, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
adjusted p-value for multiple comparisons. We also tested whether treatment affected the age structure 
of the household, given that we have detected some changes in household size, by estimating Models 1 
and 2 for the four age categories reported in Appendix Table A4b. We did not find any significant effect 
at conventional levels. These results are available upon request.  
 
23 We also explored whether treatment affected education attainment, measured by the maximum 
years of schooling completed as reported in Appendix Table A4b for children 6 to 12 (primary school) 
and 13 to 18 years old (secondary school). Overall, we did not find any significant effect. We only 
detected a small negative effect in Mexico for children 13 to 18 years old but this variable was 
unbalanced at baseline for this group in this sample in the same direction and magnitude that the 
detected effect. Instead, in Uruguay, for the same age group, we did find a positive and statistically 
significant small effect. These results are also available upon request.  
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but this is not the case in Uruguay. However, given our sample sizes, the estimated coefficients 
are imprecisely estimated and hence are not statistically significant at conventional levels. The 
point estimates, though, show a large decrease in diarrhea both in Mexico and in El Salvador.24 
As a result, the overall effect, pooling across countries, is still large (a decrease of approximately 
18% with a p-value equal to 0.17).25 If we assume that the effect is not present in Uruguay 
because, there, the experiment took place in a better, more urbanized environment where 
people have greater access to services, then the pooled effect in the other two countries, 
reported in the two last columns of the table, point to an even larger effect, of approximately 
27%, which is statistically significant at the 10% level. In contrast, we do not find significant 
evidence that would allow us to conclude that there is a large effect in terms of the reduction 
of the prevalence of respiratory diseases. Nevertheless, the health summary index is also 
statistically significant at the 5% level for those two countries together.26 
    
6. Who Lives in Slums 
The most robust result so far appears to be that upgrading dwelling infrastructural has large 
impacts on quality of life measured by satisfaction. This is despite conventional explanations 
that attribute the emergence of slums to the fact that the poor are willing to live in substandard 
housing in polluted or floodable areas or on slopes, ridges and other inhospitable geographical 
environments if they also could be close to employment opportunities in the city center (see, 
                                                          
24 In both cases, the percentage changes are larger than the one estimated by Cattaneo et al. (2008) 
though the treatments nor the compliance rates are comparable between studies.  
 
25 We also interacted the intention-to-treat dummy variable with a dummy indicating whether, in the 
samples of El Salvador and Uruguay, the settlement was randomized to a high intensity treatment level. 
The interaction was never found statistically significant at conventional levels whether the standard 
errors were clustered or not at the settlement level. These results are also available upon request.  
 
26 Since this analysis is based on a set of assumptions, we do not contrast these results with the adjusted 
p-values, though the effect on the summary index would remain significant under this more stringent 
contrast.   
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for example, Glaeser, 2011).27 Slum dwellers may have a strong preference for being close to 
the labor market –so strong that it may offset any kind of disadvantage that living in an 
irregular settlement may entail.   
In this section, we provide some evidence to support the hypothesis that slum and non-slum 
dwellers have different preferences for income and housing. In Tables 7a to 7f, we compare a 
large number of outcomes of interest in regard to the slum population using information from 
the national household surveys of El Salvador, Mexico and Uruguay on the poor and non-poor 
populations in the same geographical areas as our TECHO samples.28 The first column of each 
table shows the mean of the variable of interest for the poor population and the second for the 
slum dwellers targeted by TECHO. The third column shows the differential between the 
outcomes for the poor and the slum dwellers. For El Salvador and Mexico, we also show in the 
fourth column what the differential is once we control for a dummy that indicates whether the 
household is in a rural or urban area. In those cases, our preferred estimate of the differentials 
is the one shown in this last column of each table. 
The first salient aspect of the comparison is that, in all three countries, slum dwellers are in 
general even worse-off in terms of assets than other poor populations. For instance, the share 
of rooms with good-quality floors is 14% among slum inhabitants compared to 61% for the poor 
population of El Salvador overall. In Mexico and Uruguay, the share of rooms with good-quality 
floors among the non-slum poor is 20 percentage points greater than it is for slum dwellers. 
Rates for water connections, access to toilets and sewerage systems, and possession of 
                                                          
27 In fact, for example, one of the reasons mentioned by Banerjee et al. (2008) for the rise of 
unemployment in South Africa after the end of apartheid in 1994 is the high cost of job searches for the 
black population, since the country’s persistent geographical racial segregation has confined blacks to 
areas far away from the city center, which is also hard to reach due to the unavailability of good public 
transportation. The end of apartheid thus resulted in an increase in the labor supply among the black 
population that, in light of high job-search costs, could not find a match in labor demand. 
 
28 In the case of Uruguay, the national survey enables us to distinguish between poor slum dwellers and 
poor groups not living in slum conditions. This is rather unique, since in general, household surveys have 
very low coverage of slums settlements, if any (see, among others, Marx et al., 2013), and hence, we use 
that national survey for the analysis in this section though restricting it to the geographical areas 
covered in our study. Instead, in El Salvador and Mexico, the information for slum dwellers comes 
exclusively from our baseline survey. 
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refrigerators and TV sets are all significantly higher for the average poor household of El 
Salvador and Mexico than for slum dwellers in the same country. In Uruguay, the differences 
are smaller –in part because the average rates are much higher among this highly urban 
population.  
In Uruguay and Mexico, however, the incomes of slum dwellers are higher than the incomes of 
poor non-slum dwellers. In Mexico, the slum dwellers included in our baseline survey earn, on 
average, USD 108 per month per capita, while the average income for the poor population is 
USD 86 – a difference of 25%. In Uruguay, slum dwellers earn an impressive 71% more than 
poor non-slum dwellers, and the difference between men’s and women’s incomes is also 
significant in both countries. Consequently, the question that naturally arises is how we can 
explain why slum dwellers earn more but live in much worse housing units. Not only are 
monthly incomes higher, but also the wage incomes of slum dwellers are significantly higher 
than those of the rest of the poor population. The difference amounts to approximately 40% in 
Uruguay and 30% in Mexico when we average the wage differentials for both men and women. 
El Salvador is different that than Mexico and Uruguay. In economic terms, the TECHO 
households in El Salvador are much more disadvantaged in all respects.  In this case, the labor 
market outcomes of slum dwellers are worse than those of the poor not living in slums.  
However, educational attainment of heads households and school enrollment rates of their 
children are also worse in slums. This may have to do with the fact that many moved to slums in 
El Salvador to escape violent civil conflict as opposed to seeing economic opportunity. As such, 
this type of person who moved to a slum would be different in El Salvador compared to Mexico 
and Uruguay where the main motive was economic opportunity.   
The results seem to be consistent with the existence of poor groups with different preferences. 
We find that, while slum dwellers have clearly worse housing infrastructure than the rest of the 
poor population, they earn significantly more than poor people living in non-slum areas even 
though they have the same levels of human capital. There appears to be an intrinsic “selection” 
among the poor: those who prefer to have good access to the labor market in cities tend to 
gather in slums, while those who are less willing to do so live in better environments, although 
at a significant cost in terms of income. Moving forward, an understanding of these differences 
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will be crucial in improving the design of policies for upgrading the living conditions of the 
urban poor. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper provides an analysis of the impact of providing better houses in situ to slum dwellers 
in El Salvador, Mexico and Uruguay. As expected, the quality of housing greatly improves after 
the intervention. Subsequently, satisfaction with housing and with the quality of life increases 
drastically. This is a very significant result since it suggests that limited in situ improvements in 
the housing of poor families has a large effect on their overall well-being. This finding is 
consistent with those of Cattaneo et. al (2009) and Devoto et. al (2011) and highlights the 
importance of using subjective indicators to evaluate interventions such as housing 
improvement programs, where the main objective is to facilitate the quality of family and social 
interactions. Thus, we conclude that the type house is an important input in a household’s 
utility function irrespective of whether they affect other material outcomes. Our results show 
that, as in the case of the interventions analyzed by Cattaneo et al. (2009) and Devoto et al. 
(2011), improvements in housing conditions have a clearly positive effect on the satisfaction 
and well-being of poor slum dwellers.  
Additionally, also in line with Cattaneo et al. (2009), we find that the improved housing 
conditions lead to large reductions in the incidence of diarrhea, at least in two of the three 
experiments. The one case in which these improvements do not seem to have health effects is 
the one in which the experiment took place in a better, more urbanized environment in which 
services are more accessible. 
The provision of better housing has virtually no other statistically significant effects. 
Perceptions of security and safety change for the better only in El Salvador, while there is no 
change in the other two countries. In all three countries, better housing has little or no effect 
on further housing investments to supplement the upgrading intervention, the possession of 
durable goods, household structure or labor outcomes.  
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In this study we also compare slum dwellers to the rest of the poor population in the areas 
analyzed. When we consider the slum dwellers’ situation within their national contexts, it 
becomes possible to shed some light on their housing decisions and the dynamics of slum 
formation. We find that slum dwellers have clearly worse housing infrastructure than poor non-
slum dwellers. However, in the more urban areas, the slum dwellers earn significantly more 
than other poor households and have comparable levels of educational attainment and labor-
market participation outcomes. These findings are consistent with the plausible explanation for 
slum formation as a consequence of some poor groups being more willing to trade off living 
conditions for better access to the labor market. These poor households choose to live in 
substandard dwellings in slum areas because they tend to be closer to production activities 
than other parts of urban conglomerates. At the same time, other poor people are less willing 
to do so and therefore live in better environments but at a significant cost in terms of their 
income. The existence of these two types of poor households with different preferences should 
be taken into account when designing housing policies. 
  
These findings contribute inputs for the debate about slum upgrading initiatives. What emerges 
from our analysis is that the provision of the kind of in situ housing upgrade that we studied in 
this paper has some significant effects on the living conditions of slum dwellers but that those 
effects are perhaps not as large as society might wish or expect. At first glance, the conclusion 
to be drawn from this finding might be that in situ upgrading should be ruled out and priority 
should be given to geographic relocation policies. This conclusion could, however, be in error. 
First of all, the in situ intervention is fairly inexpensive and substantially increases life 
satisfaction. What is more, in the two countries where we detect a reduction in the incidence of 
diarrhea, the effects are quite large. Additionally, Cattaneo et al. (2006) analyzed the 
performance of the Mexican “Iniciamos Tu Casa” program, which provided new houses to poor 
inhabitants. These houses were located far from the city center. A year after the program had 
started, the authors found that a large proportion of the participants had abandoned the 
houses; moreover, those who remained in them mentioned that, although housing conditions 
were better, the new neighborhoods provided them with poor access to public goods and 
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general infrastructure. In situ upgrading therefore appears to remain a valid policy choice. This 
is also consistent with the evidence presented in Takeuchi et al. (2008) for Mumbai. These 
authors use a residential location model to assess the welfare of an in situ slum upgrade 
program and a slum relocation program and conclude that, at least for those households 
relocated to more remote locations, the disadvantages of changes in commute distance wipe 
out the housing benefits of the program and that the treated households would have been 
better off if they had been given access to the more limited housing improvements provided by 
the in situ intervention. This is also consistent with the evidence that we present in Section 4, 
where we show that, as noted above, at least in urban areas, poor households are willing to 
trade off housing conditions for better access to labor markets and, hence, higher earnings.  
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Tables: 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
0.233 0.234 0.100 0.081 0.234 0.220 0.188 0.179
[0.117]** [0.116]** [0.132] [0.132] [0.088]*** [0.086]** [0.064]*** [0.064]***
[0.047] [0.045] [0.453] [0.544] [0.008] [0.011] [0.004] [0.006]
2.690 (1.330) 8.672 8.717 3.486 (1.636) 2.865 2.315 3.067 (1.285) 7.623 7.168 3.088 (1.440) 6.101 5.789
0.284 0.288 0.197 0.198 0.111 0.110 0.182 0.183
[0.027]*** [0.026]*** [0.033]*** [0.033]*** [0.022]*** [0.022]*** [0.016]*** [0.016]***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
0.165 (0.274) 172.631 174.942 0.317 (0.415) 62.214 62.433 0.706 (0.355) 15.712 15.525 0.442 (0.426) 41.309 41.370
0.255 0.255 0.136 0.137 0.167 0.163 0.178 0.176
[0.026]*** [0.026]*** [0.035]*** [0.035]*** [0.024]*** [0.024]*** [0.017]*** [0.017]***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
0.104 (0.223) 245.382 245.580 0.483 (0.471) 28.071 28.373 0.420 (0.388) 39.665 38.783 0.352 (0.410) 50.422 50.094
0.231 0.235 0.188 0.189 0.099 0.096 0.161 0.160
[0.030]*** [0.030]*** [0.033]*** [0.033]*** [0.022]*** [0.022]*** [0.016]*** [0.016]***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
0.283 (0.385) 81.636 83.148 0.312 (0.414) 60.036 60.439 0.599 (0.374) 16.527 16.011 0.427 (0.416) 37.760 37.565
0.233 0.235 0.111 0.115 0.183 0.179 0.171 0.171
[0.024]*** [0.024]*** [0.025]*** [0.025]*** [0.021]*** [0.021]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
0.192 (0.274) 121.692 122.649 0.607 (0.336) 18.352 18.945 0.303 (0.329) 60.473 58.983 0.364 (0.358) 46.998 46.986
0.760 0.767 0.322 0.324 0.348 0.339 0.439 0.437
[0.634]*** [0.063]*** [0.040]*** [0.040]*** [0.036]*** [0.036]*** [0.026]*** [0.026]***
0.000 (0.651) [0.000] [0.000] 0.000 (0.520) [0.000] [0.000] 0.000 (0.586) [0.000] [0.000] 0.000 (0.586) [0.000] [0.000]
Housing Quality Summary 
Index (z-score)
Share of Rooms with Window
Number of Rooms
Share of Rooms with Good 
Quality Floors
Share of Rooms with Good 
Quality Walls
Share of Rooms with Good 
Quality Roofs
Table 1a. Regressions of housing quality on Program Dummy.  a
a Responses regarding construction materials used in rooms were included only for those households that reported information for all rooms.  All the reggresions have a dummy by caserio. 
Model 1: No Controls; Model 2: Control for HH's Years of Schooling,  HH's Gender, HH's Age, Assets - Value Per Capita (USD),  Monthly Income Per Capita (USD), all measured during the 
baseline round. Following the standard procedure, when a control variable has a missing value, we impute a value equal to 0 and add a dummy variable equal to 1 for that observation, which 
indicates that the control variable was missed. The Housing Quality Summary Index (z-score) is defined is defined as the average of the z-scores of all the variables in the table, with the sign of 
each measure oriented so that the more beneficial outcomes have higher scores. Bonferroni corrected p-value=0.02 for a significance level of 0.1. Reported results: estimated coefficient, robust 
standard error, p-value and 100*coefficient/follow-up control mean, in that order.
*Significant at 10% level. **Significant at 5% level. ***Significant at 1% level.  
All
Follow Up 
Control Mean 
(Std. Dev.)
Follow Up 
Control Mean 
(Std. Dev.)
El Salvador Uruguay
Follow Up 
Control Mean 
(Std. Dev.)
Mexico
Follow Up 
Control Mean 
(Std. Dev.)
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Dependent Variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
-0.008 -0.006 -0.014 -0.009 -0.008 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010
[0.010] [0.010] [0.037] [0.037] [0.010] [0.010] [0.013] [0.013]
[0.418] [0.558] [0.706] [0.809] [0.421] [0.361] [0.453] [0.488]
0.016 (0.123) -52.691 -39.219 0.335 (0.472) -4.249 -2.707 0.020 (0.140) -42.203 -49.262 0.112 (0.315) -9.258 -8.533
-0.062 -0.059 0.008 0.002 -0.010 -0.012 -0.017 -0.018
[0.034]* [0.034]* [0.022] [0.022] [0.032] [0.032] [0.017] [0.017]
[0.072] [0.089] [0.742] [0.936] [0.744] [0.713] [0.336] [0.293]
0.252 (0.434) -24.626 -23.411 0.897 (0.304) 0.840 0.205 0.551 (0.498) -1.901 -2.157 0.573 (0.494) -2.944 -3.217
-0.046 -0.038 0.024 0.024 -0.044 -0.048 -0.021 -0.022
[0.042] [0.042] [0.018] [0.018] [0.022]* [0.023]** [0.015] [0.015]
[0.279] [0.370] [0.191] [0.193] [0.058] [0.039] [0.166] [0.153]
0.496 (0.500) -9.347 -7.687 0.933 (0.251) 2.548 2.558 0.903 (0.297) -4.831 -5.289 0.800 (0.400) -2.664 -2.755
0.016 0.022 -0.014 -0.023 -0.051 -0.054 -0.022 -0.024
[0.032] [0.032] [0.039] [0.038] [0.023]** [0.022]** [0.018] [0.018]
[0.626] [0.507] [0.724] [0.560] [0.029] [0.018] [0.233] [0.195]
0.167 (0.373) 9.640 13.014 0.521 (0.500) -2.654 -4.337 0.252 (0.434) -20.071 -21.606 0.309 (0.462) -7.071 -7.623
-0.069 -0.063 -0.011 -0.015 0.012 0.008 -0.016 -0.019
[0.042] [0.042] [0.035] [0.035] [0.034] [0.034] [0.021] [0.021]
[0.103] [0.133] [0.748] [0.663] [0.727] [0.826] [0.459] [0.377]
0.516 (0.500) -13.436 -12.315 0.730 (0.444) -1.547 -2.107 0.392 (0.488) 3.039 1.920 0.527 (0.499) -2.981 -3.548
-0.066 -0.055 0.006 0.000 -0.054 -0.061 -0.036 -0.039
[0.033]* [0.036] [0.034] [0.034] [0.027]* [0.027]** [0.018]* [0.018]**
0.000 (0.467) [0.070] [0.131] 0.000 (0.456) [0.866] [0.995] 0.000 (0.426) [0.051] [0.028] 0.000 (0.446) [0.052] [0.036]
a Responses regarding construction materials used in rooms were included only for those households that reported information for all rooms.  All the reggresions have a dummy by caserio. 
Model 1: No Controls; Model 2: Control for HH's Years of Schooling,  HH's Gender, HH's Age, Assets - Value Per Capita (USD),  Monthly Income Per Capita (USD), all measured during the 
baseline round. Following the standard procedure, when a control variable has a missing value, we impute a value equal to 0 and add a dummy variable equal to 1 for that observation, which 
indicates that the control variable was missed. The Housing Investment Summary Index (z-score) is defined as the average of the z-scores of all the variables in the table, with the sign of each 
measure oriented so that the more beneficial outcomes have higher scores. Bonferroni corrected p-value=0.02 for a significance level of 0.1. Reported results: estimated coefficient, robust 
standard error, p-value and 100*coefficient/follow-up control mean, in that order.
*Significant at 10% level. **Significant at 5% level. ***Significant at 1% level.  
Housing Investment 
Summary Index (z-score)
House with Own Toilet
Use Gas Stove or Kerosene 
to Cook
Electricity Connection inside 
the House 
Water in Terrain
Sink on Room where food is 
prepared
Follow Up 
Control Mean 
Follow Up 
Control Mean 
Follow Up 
Control Mean 
Follow Up 
Control Mean 
Table 1b. Regressions of housing investment on Program Dummy.  a
El Salvador Uruguay Mexico All
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Dependent Variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
0.387 0.389 0.121 0.122 0.108 0.107 0.180 0.181
[0.039]*** [0.040]*** [0.038]*** [0.038]*** [0.034]*** [0.034]*** [0.022]*** [0.021]***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000]
0.163 (0.369) 237.502 239.017 0.314 (0.464) 38.669 38.779 0.551 (0.498) 19.556 19.490 0.374 (0.484) 48.254 48.313
0.477 0.479 0.142 0.141 0.149 0.148 0.226 0.226
[0.039]*** [0.040]*** [0.037]*** [0.037]*** [0.035]*** [0.035]*** [0.022]*** [0.021]***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
0.132 (0.338) 361.860 363.502 0.267 (0.443) 52.998 52.789 0.439 (0.496) 33.878 33.732 0.303 (0.459) 74.603 74.413
0.476 0.477 0.179 0.176 0.153 0.156 0.241 0.241
[0.038]*** [0.039]*** [0.037]*** [0.038]*** [0.034]*** [0.035]*** [0.021]*** [0.021]***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
0.159 (0.366) 299.531 300.417 0.339 (0.474) 52.784 51.817 0.404 (0.491) 37.937 38.514 0.317 (0.465) 75.867 76.034
0.426 0.427 0.166 0.160 0.094 0.096 0.199 0.199
[0.038]*** [0.039]*** [0.038]*** [0.038]*** [0.034]*** [0.035]*** [0.021]*** [0.022]***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.007] [0.006] [0.000] [0.000]
0.167 (0.373) 255.350 256.348 0.325 (0.469) 51.073 49.101 0.347 (0.476) 27.234 27.718 0.291 (0.454) 68.601 68.494
0.207 0.211 0.096 0.097 0.165 0.165 0.151 0.151
[0.045]*** [0.046]*** [0.039]** [0.039]** [0.032]*** [0.032]*** [0.022]*** [0.022]***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.015] [0.015] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
0.506 (0.501) 40.915 41.685 0.449 (0.498) 21.379 21.635 0.593 (0.491) 27.791 27.931 0.527 (0.499) 28.691 28.693
1.055 1.061 0.299 0.295 0.272 0.274 0.471 0.472
[0.086]*** [0.088]*** [0.059]*** [0.060]*** [0.050]*** [0.050]*** [0.037]*** [0.037]***
0.000 (0.781) [0.000] [0.000] 0.000 (0.734) [0.000] [0.000] 0.000 (0.751) [0.000] [0.000] 0.000 (0.753) [0.000] [0.000]
Satisfaction Summary 
Index (z-score)
Satisfaction with Quality of 
Life
Table 2. Regressions of Satisfaction on Program Dummy.  a
a All the reggresions have a dummy by caserio. Model 1: No Controls; Model 2: Control for HH's Years of Schooling,  HH's Gender, HH's Age, Assets - Value Per Capita (USD),  Monthly 
Income Per Capita (USD), all measured during the baseline round. Following the standard procedure, when a control variable has a missing value, we impute a value equal to 0 and add a 
dummy variable equal to 1 for that observation, which indicates that the control variable was missed. The Satisfaction Summary Index (z-score) is defined is defined as the average of the z-
scores of all the variables in the table, with the sign of each measure oriented so that the more beneficial outcomes have higher scores. Bonferroni corrected p-value=0.02 for a significance 
level of 0.1. Reported results: estimated coefficient, robust standard error, p-value and 100*coefficient/follow-up control mean, in that order.
All
Follow Up 
Control Mean 
(Std. Dev.)
Uruguay
Follow Up 
Control Mean 
(Std. Dev.)
El Salvador
*Significant at 10% level. **Significant at 5% level. ***Significant at 1% level  
Satisfaction with House 
Protection against Water 
when it rains
Satisfaction with Floor 
Quality
Satisfaction with Wall 
Quality
Satisfaction with Roof 
Quality
Follow Up 
Control Mean 
(Std. Dev.)
Mexico
Follow Up 
Control Mean 
(Std. Dev.)
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Dependent Variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
0.175 0.178 0.029 0.025 0.001 0.003 0.053 0.052
[0.040]*** [0.041]*** [0.038] [0.038] [0.031] [0.031] [0.021]** [0.021]**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.455] [0.507] [0.969] [0.936] [0.013] [0.013]
0.643 (0.479) 27.121 27.676 0.621 (0.486) 4.597 4.088 0.718 (0.450) 0.172 0.356 0.668 (0.471) 7.870 7.807
0.155 0.159 -0.066 -0.069 0.014 0.018 0.021 0.022
[0.043]*** [0.043]*** [0.037]* [0.037]* [0.035] [0.035] [0.022] [0.022]
[0.000] [0.000] [0.078] [0.068] [0.686] [0.614] [0.348] [0.321]
0.601 (0.490) 25.743 26.447 0.376 (0.485) -17.683 -18.381 0.551 (0.498) 2.583 3.218 0.512 (0.500) 4.069 4.292
0.141 0.144 0.001 -0.002 -0.007 -0.006 0.032 0.030
[0.043]*** [0.043]*** [0.029] [0.029] [0.026] [0.026] [0.018]* [0.018]
[0.001] [0.001] [0.986] [0.936] [0.806] [0.823] [0.085] [0.101]
0.248 (0.432) 56.923 57.872 0.170 (0.376) 0.308 -1.420 0.162 (0.368) -4.053 -3.699 0.188 (0.390) 16.870 16.030
0.023 0.023 0.013 0.013 0.002 0.002 0.011 0.011
[0.019] [0.019] [0.035] [0.035] [0.017] [0.017] [0.014] [0.014]
[0.229] [0.228] [0.705] [0.710] [0.931] [0.912] [0.466] [0.471]
0.031 (0.173) 74.207 74.494 0.268 (0.443) 4.949 4.898 0.065 (0.246) 2.336 2.963 0.116 (0.319) 9.283 9.201
0.218 0.223 -0.026 -0.031 0.001 0.004 0.045 0.044
[0.062]*** [0.062]*** [0.050] [0.050] [0.044] [0.044] [0.029] [0.029]
0.000 (0.681) [0.001] [0.000] 0.000 (0.645) [0.602] [0.538] 0.000 (0.634) [0.975] [0.930] 0.000 (0.650) [0.132] [0.141]
Perception of Security Summary 
Index (z-score)
Safe inside the house during the 
last 12 months 
Safe leaving the house alone 
during the last 12 months 
Safe leaving the kids alone in the 
house during the last 12 months 
The house had been robbed in the 
last 12 months 
Table 3. Regressions of Perception of Security on Program Dummy.  a
All
Follow Up 
Control Mean 
(Std. Dev.)
Uruguay
Follow Up 
Control Mean 
(Std. Dev.)
Follow Up 
Control Mean 
(Std. Dev.)
El Salvador Mexico
Follow Up 
Control Mean 
(Std. Dev.)
a All the reggresions have a dummy by caserio. Model 1: No Controls; Model 2: Control for HH's Years of Schooling,  HH's Gender, HH's Age, Assets - Value Per Capita (USD),  Monthly Income 
Per Capita (USD), all measured during the baseline round. Following the standard procedure, when a control variable has a missing value, we impute a value equal to 0 and add a dummy variable 
equal to 1 for that observation, which indicates that the control variable was missed. The Perception of Security Summary Index (z-score) is definedis defined as the average of the z-scores of all 
the variables in the table, with the sign of each measure oriented so that the more beneficial outcomes have higher scores. Bonferroni corrected p-value=0.025 for a significance level of 0.1. 
Reported results: estimated coefficient, robust standard error, p-value and 100*coefficient/follow-up control mean, in that order.
*Significant at 10% level. **Significant at 5% level. ***Significant at 1% level. 
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Dependent Variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
T.V -0.013 -0.001 0.005 0.011 -0.034 -0.033 -0.016 -0.013
[0.047] [0.047] [0.022] [0.021] [0.030] [0.030] [0.018] [0.018]
[0.786] [0.988] [0.821] [0.599] [0.272] [0.274] [0.397] [0.465]
0.434 (0.496) -3.004 -0.162 0.926 (0.261) 0.538 1.240 0.728 (0.445) -4.616 -4.560 0.711 (0.453) -2.222 -1.898
Fan 0.015 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.001 0.000 0.010 0.009
[0.020] [0.020] [0.040] [0.040] [0.010] [0.010] [0.015] [0.015]
[0.458] [0.348] [0.656] [0.676] [0.934] [1.000] [0.516] [0.545]
0.034 (0.181) 44.316 56.566 0.535 (0.499) 3.363 3.190 0.018 (0.131) 4.942 0.011 0.177 (0.381) 5.627 5.258
Kitchen or Gas Stove 0.000 0.008 -0.008 -0.006 -0.035 -0.039 -0.018 -0.019
[0.044] [0.043] [0.034] [0.035] [0.030] [0.031] [0.020] [0.020]
[0.997] [0.853] [0.809] [0.868] [0.262] [0.210] [0.383] [0.367]
0.404 (0.491) -0.037 1.994 0.768 (0.423) -1.098 -0.764 0.451 (0.498) -7.684 -8.641 0.534 (0.499) -3.351 -3.469
Refrigerator -0.028 -0.016 -0.017 -0.016 -0.005 -0.009 -0.014 -0.015
[0.032] [0.031] [0.037] [0.037] [0.026] [0.026] [0.018] [0.018]
[0.385] [0.604] [0.661] [0.676] [0.861] [0.732] [0.454] [0.435]
0.123 (0.329) -22.833 -13.208 0.683 (0.466) -2.439 -2.322 0.207 (0.405) -2.259 -4.434 0.327 (0.469) -4.308 -4.477
Bicycle 0.037 0.043 0.014 0.019 -0.029 -0.027 0.001 0.003
[0.043] [0.043] [0.040] [0.040] [0.030] [0.030] [0.021] [0.021]
[0.400] [0.325] [0.726] [0.632] [0.347] [0.371] [0.967] [0.890]
0.323 (0.468) 11.368 13.352 0.546 (0.498) 2.596 3.530 0.279 (0.449) -10.209 -9.635 0.370 (0.483) 0.240 0.797
0.015 0.030 0.004 0.011 -0.043 -0.047 -0.013 -0.012
[0.050] [0.048] [0.046] [0.045] [0.036] [0.036] [0.024] [0.024]
0.000 (0.544) [0.769] [0.528] 0.000 (0.561) [0.929] [0.808] 0.000 (0.598) [0.241] [0.194] 0.000 (0.572) [0.608] [0.615]
Assets Summary 
Index (z-score)
a All the reggresions have a dummy by caserio. Model 1: No Controls; Model 2: Control for HH's Years of Schooling,  HH's Gender, HH's Age, Assets - Value Per Capita 
(USD),  Monthly Income Per Capita (USD), all measured during the baseline round. Following the standard procedure, when a control variable has a missing value, we 
impute a value equal to 0 and add a dummy variable equal to 1 for that observation, which indicates that the control variable was missed. The Assets Summary Index (z-
score) is defined is defined as the average of the z-scores of all the variables in the table, with the sign of each measure oriented so that the more beneficial outcomes 
have higher scores. Bonferroni corrected p-value=0.02 for a significance level of 0.1. Reported results: estimated coefficient, robust standard error, p-value and 
100*coefficient/follow-up control mean, in that order.
Table 4. Regressions of Durable Goods on Program Dummy.  a
*Significant at 10% level. **Significant at 5% level. ***Significant at 1% level.  
All
Follow Up 
Control Mean 
(Std. Dev.)
El Salvador
Follow Up 
Control Mean 
(Std. Dev.)
Follow Up 
Control Mean 
(Std. Dev.)
Uruguay Mexico
Follow Up 
Control Mean 
(Std. Dev.)
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Dependent Variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
-0.031 -0.098 0.253 0.286 0.002 -0.019 0.079 0.097
[0.273] [0.264] [0.220] [0.216] [0.175] [0.172] [0.124] [0.122]
[0.909] [0.710] [0.252] [0.188] [0.991] [0.912] [0.522] [0.428]
5.453 (2.513) -0.574 -1.806 4.954 (2.657) 5.110 5.764 5.264 (2.595) 0.037 -0.363 5.223 (2.596) 1.521 1.855
Newborns (<1) 0.011 0.010 -0.009 -0.007 0.028 0.027 0.011 0.013
[0.031] [0.032] [0.028] [0.028] [0.025] [0.025] [0.016] [0.016]
[0.732] [0.748] [0.748] [0.817] [0.263] [0.293] [0.485] [0.418]
0.116 (0.321) 9.361 8.914 0.124 (0.351) -7.290 -5.280 0.110 (0.320) 25.660 24.278 0.116 (0.330) 9.745 11.287
Newborns (<2) -0.018 -0.022 0.053 0.068 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.028
[0.041] [0.041] [0.041] [0.040]* [0.036] [0.035] [0.022] [0.022]
[0.668] [0.591] [0.205] [0.096] [0.526] [0.530] [0.314] [0.213]
0.229 (0.429) -7.789 -9.733 0.262 (0.515) 20.023 25.770 0.239 (0.477) 9.548 9.375 0.243 (0.476) 9.490 11.545
-0.007 -0.020 0.057 0.073 0.045 0.041 0.037 0.044
[0.079] [0.078] [0.064] [0.064] [0.056] [0.056] [0.037] [0.037]
0.000 (0.742) [0.933] [0.805] 0.000 (0.789) [0.377] [0.252] 0.000 (0.761) [0.421] [0.470] 0.000 (0.763) [0.327] [0.234]
*Significant at 10% level. **Significant at 5% level. ***Significant at 1% level  
HH Size
Demographic 
Summary Index (z-
score)
Table 5a. Regressions of Demographics Variables on Program Dummy. a
a All the reggresions have a dummy by caserio. Model 1: No Controls; Model 2: Control for HH's Years of Schooling,  HH's Gender, HH's Age, Assets - Value Per Capita (USD),  Monthly 
Income Per Capita (USD), all measured during the baseline round. Following the standard procedure, when a control variable has a missing value, we impute a value equal to 0 and add a 
dummy variable equal to 1 for that observation, which indicates that the control variable was missed. The Demographic Summary Index (z-score) is defined is defined as the average of the 
z-scores of all the variables in the table, with the sign of each measure oriented so that the more beneficial outcomes have higher scores. Bonferroni corrected p-value=0.033 for a 
significance level of 0.1. Reported results: estimated coefficient, robust standard error, p-value and 100*coefficient/follow-up control mean, in that order. 
All
Follow Up 
Control Mean 
(Std. Dev.)
Uruguay
Follow Up Control 
Mean (Std. Dev.)
Mexico
Follow Up 
Control Mean 
(Std. Dev.)
El Salvador
Follow Up 
Control Mean 
(Std. Dev.)
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Dependent Variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
0.704 1.373 -3.371 -3.788 -0.422 0.245 -1.835 -2.297
[3.098] [2.923] [13.443] [13.399] [3.759] [3.814] [3.905] [3.867]
[0.820] [0.639] [0.802] [0.777] [0.911] [0.949] [0.638] [0.553]
31.618 (29.224) 2.226 4.342 94.862 (156.792) -3.554 -3.993 55.422 (54.912) -0.762 0.442 59.572 (81.054) -3.081 -3.856
1.738 1.000 0.025 0.563 0.824 0.668 0.704 0.825
[2.072] [2.073] [1.821] [1.829] [1.616] [1.573] [1.055] [1.039]
[0.402] [0.630] [0.989] [0.758] [0.610] [0.671] [0.505] [0.428]
38.033 (17.351) 4.570 2.630 39.081 (19.877) 0.064 1.440 41.086 (19.498) 2.006 1.625 39.711 (19.154) 1.773 2.077
4.974 4.654 -0.047 -0.116 -3.052 -1.696 -0.693 -0.619
[5.418] [5.817] [2.661] [2.678] [3.026] [3.129] [1.883] [1.887]
[0.361] [0.426] [0.986] [0.966] [0.315] [0.588] [0.713] [0.743]
35.500 (25.995) 14.012 13.111 39.353 (19.561) -0.120 -0.294 28.250 (18.867) -10.805 -6.005 34.194 (20.903) -2.027 -1.810
0.054 0.056 -0.010 -0.004 -0.009 -0.008 0.006 0.008
[0.042] [0.041] [0.039] [0.040] [0.032] [0.032] [0.021] [0.021]
0.000 (0.459) [0.202] [0.174] 0.000 (0.506) [0.809] [0.913] 0.000 (0.490) [0.781] [0.818] 0.000 (0.486) [0.781] [0.710]
a In the case of monetary variables, observations over the 99th percentile were excluded. With regard to the number of hours worked, cases in which more than 84 hours were reported were 
not considered. All the reggresions have a dummy by caserio. Model 1: No Controls; Model 2: Control for HH's Years of Schooling,  HH's Gender, HH's Age, Assets - Value Per Capita 
(USD),  Monthly Income Per Capita (USD), all measured during the baseline round. Following the standard procedure, when a control variable has a missing value, we impute a value equal to 
0 and add a dummy variable equal to 1 for that observation, which indicates that the control variable was missed. The Economic Summary Index (z-score) is defined is defined as the average 
of the z-scores of all the variables in the table, with the sign of each measure oriented so that the more beneficial outcomes have higher scores. Bonferroni corrected p-value=0.033 for a 
significance level of 0.1. Reported results: estimated coefficient, robust standard error, p-value and 100*coefficient/follow-up control mean, in that order. 
*Significant at 10% level. **Significant at 5% level. ***Significant at 1% level  
Economic Summary 
Index (z-score)
Hours worked last week by 
Spouse
Hours worked last week by 
Head of HH
Monthly Income Per 
Capita (USD)
Follow Up 
Control Mean 
(Std. Dev.)
Follow Up Control 
Mean (Std. Dev.)
Follow Up 
Control Mean 
(Std. Dev.)
Follow Up 
Control Mean 
(Std. Dev.)
Table 5b. Regressions of Labor and Income Variables on Program Dummy. a
El Salvador Uruguay Mexico All
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Dependent Variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
-0.041 -0.045 -0.002 0.002 -0.047 -0.043 -0.029 -0.028 -0.047 -0.045
[0.060] [0.062] [0.034] [0.034] [0.043] [0.043] [0.025] [0.025] [0.035] [0.035]
[0.498] [0.466] [0.963] [0.948] [0.283] [0.333] [0.249] [0.267] [0.182] [0.204]
0.690 (0.463) -5.950 -6.558 0.175 (0.381) -0.934 1.290 0.417 (0.494) -11.314 -10.213 0.403 (0.490) -7.225 -6.987 0.519 (0.500) -9.055 -8.662
-0.050 -0.054 -0.011 -0.003 -0.035 -0.033 -0.027 -0.024 -0.040 -0.038
[0.042] [0.044] [0.034] [0.034] [0.028] [0.028] [0.019] [0.019] [0.023]* [0.023]
[0.243] [0.224] [0.737] [0.930] [0.224] [0.246] [0.172] [0.219] [0.095] [0.108]
0.168 (0.374) -29.924 -32.004 0.158 (0.365) -7.261 -1.885 0.135 (0.342) -25.534 -24.600 0.151 (0.358) -17.801 -16.038 0.147 (0.354) -26.822 -26.102
0.114 0.122 0.016 0.002 0.092 0.087 0.064 0.059 0.100 0.097
[0.092] [0.094] [0.066] [0.067] [0.061] [0.061] [0.040] [0.040] [0.050]** [0.051]*
0.000 (0.743) [0.219] [0.196] 0.000 (0.725) [0.812] [0.977] 0.000 (0.755) [0.131] [0.161] 0.000 (0.741) [0.111] [0.143] 0.000 (0.750) [0.048] [0.059]
El Salvador and MexicoEl Salvador Uruguay Mexico All
Table 6. Regressions of Health Variables of Children on Program Dummy. a
Respiratory 
Disease during last 
4 weeks
Follow Up 
Control Mean 
(Std. Dev.)
Follow Up 
Control Mean 
(Std. Dev.)
Follow Up 
Control Mean 
(Std. Dev.)
Follow Up 
Control Mean 
(Std. Dev.)
Follow Up 
Control Mean 
(Std. Dev.)
a All the regressions have a dummy by caserio. Model 1: Control for Age, Age Squared, Gender, and a dummy equal to 1 if the mother lives in the household at the time of the follow-up round; Model 2: Control 
for Age, Age Squared, Gender, a dummy equal to 1 if the mother lives in the household at the time of the follow-up round and also for HH's Years of Schooling,  HH's Gender, HH's Age, Assets - Value Per 
Capita (USD), and Monthly Income Per Capita (USD) at the time of the baseline round. Following the standard procedure, when a control variable has a missing value, we impute a value equal to 0 and add a 
dummy variable equal to 1 for that observation, which indicates that the control variable was missed. The Health Summary Index (z-score) is defined is defined as the average of the z-scores of all the 
variables in the table, with the sign of each measure oriented so that the more beneficial outcomes have higher scores. Bonferroni corrected p-value=0.05 for a significance level of 0.1. Reported results: 
estimated coefficient, robust standard error, p-value and 100*coefficient/follow-up control mean, in that order. 
*Significant at 10% level. **Significant at 5% level. ***Significant at 1% level  
Diarrhea during last 
4 weeks
Health Summary 
Index (z-score)
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Variable
(1) Mean of 
Observations 
National Poor 
(EHPM 2008) b
(2) Mean of 
Observations 
Settlements 
(UTPMP 2007-
08)
Difference     
(1) - (2)
Difference    
(1) - (2)d
Income Indicator (HH)
Monthly Income Per Capita (USD) c 37.293 30.146 7.147 2.844
(0.622) (1.777) (1.896)*** (2.173)
Employment Indicators (IND)
Employment rate 16-64 0.540 0.510 0.030 0.019
(0.006) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
Employment rate Males 16-64 0.352 0.368 -0.015 0.000
(0.006) (0.014) (0.016) (0.018)
Employment rate Females 16-64 0.188 0.143 0.046 0.018
(0.006) (0.014) (0.016)*** (0.016)
Wage employment rate 16-64 0.328 0.195 0.134 0.122
(0.007) (0.016) (0.018)*** (0.017)***
Wage employment rate Males 16-64 0.234 0.172 0.061 0.065
(0.006) (0.014) (0.015)*** (0.015)***
Wage employment rate Females 16-64 0.095 0.022 0.073 0.058
(0.003) (0.005) (0.007)*** (0.006)***
Self employment rate 16-64 0.212 0.313 -0.100 -0.101
(0.006) (0.020) (0.021)*** (0.021)***
Self employment rate Males 16-64 0.119 0.192 -0.074 -0.061
(0.005) (0.022) (0.023)*** (0.024)**
Self employment rate Females 16-64 0.094 0.121 -0.027 -0.040
(0.004) (0.010) (0.012)** (0.012)***
Average Wage Males 16-64 c 132.607 87.041 45.565 35.581
(2.206) (5.850) (6.167)*** (5.356)***
Average Wage Females 16-64 c 111.619 84.060 27.560 18.781
(2.216) (5.105) (5.514)*** (6.059)***
*Significant at 10% level. **Significant at 5% level. ***Significant at 1% level  
Table 7a. Differences of Means between Poors, Non Poors and Slum 
Dwellers. El Salvadora
a Figures computed at household and individual levels in El Salvador using the 2008 multi-purpose household survey 
for all provinces (known as "departments") in which there are UTPMP households (excludes San Salvador Department) 
and UTPMP impact evaluation baseline data sources. Standard errors are clustered at the primary sample unit level 
shown in parentheses. 
b The term "national poor "refers to households whose members were living on less than USD 89.4 per capita per 
month in urban zones and less than USD 58.2 per capita per month in rural zones in 2008; these figures are equivalent 
to two basic baskets for urban and rural areas, which represent the national poverty line and basic needs in El Salvador 
as of 2008.
c In the case of monetary variables, observations over the 99th percentile were excluded.
d Since price levels in urban and rural zones in El Salvador differ, in this column we test the hypothesis of equal means 
by controlling for a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the household is located in a rural zone. 
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Variable
(1) Mean of 
Observations 
National Poor 
(EHPM 2008) b
(2) Mean of 
Observations 
Settlements 
(UTPMP 2007-
08)
Difference 
(1) - (2)
Difference 
(1) - (2)c
Demographics
4.669 4.977 -0.308 -0.181
(0.052) (0.129) (0.132)** (0.138)
0.288 0.213 0.075 0.047
(0.009) (0.015) (0.018)*** (0.020)**
46.904 44.717 2.187 1.783
(0.383) (0.927) (1.019)** (0.989)*
3.693 2.438 1.255 0.825
(0.086) (0.184) (0.198)*** (0.161)***
0.827 0.931 -0.104 -0.120
(0.009) (0.013) (0.016)*** (0.017)***
0.622 0.578 0.044 0.010
(0.015) (0.037) (0.041) (0.040)
Housing and Assets
0.507 0.126 0.381 0.343
(0.009) (0.012) (0.015)*** (0.019)***
0.606 0.144 0.462 0.385
(0.014) (0.014) (0.019)*** (0.029)***
0.553 0.215 0.339 0.249
(0.017) (0.051) (0.051)*** (0.042)***
0.781 0.483 0.298 0.279
(0.010) (0.041) (0.042)*** (0.040)***
0.534 0.009 0.525 0.382
(0.034) (0.004) (0.033)*** (0.064)***
0.805 0.391 0.414 0.352
(0.011) (0.058) (0.060)*** (0.051)***
0.331 0.075 0.256 0.199
(0.012) (0.019) (0.023)*** (0.032)***
0.666 0.436 0.230 0.168
(0.014) (0.037) (0.039)*** (0.030)***
Table 7b. Differences of Means between Poors, Non 
Poors and Slum Dweller. El Salvadora
Electricity Connection inside the 
House 
a Figures computed at household and individual levels in El Salvador using the 2008 multi-purpose 
household survey (EHPM) for all provinces (known as "departments") in which there are UTPMP 
households (excludes San Salvador Department) and UTPMP impact evaluation baseline data 
sources. Standard errors are clustered at the primary sample unit level shown in parentheses.
b The term "national poor "refers to households whose members were living on less than USD 89.4 per 
capita per month in urban zones and less than USD 58.2 per capita per month in rural zones in 2008; 
these figures are equivalent to two basic baskets for urban and rural areas, which represent the national 
poverty line and basic needs in El Salvador in 2008.
c Since price levels in urban and rural zones in El Salvador differ, in this column we test the hypothesis 
of equal means by controlling for a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the household is located in a 
rural zone.  
HH Size
Female Head
Head of HH's Age
Head of HH's Years of Schooling
Children 5-12 enrolled in school
Children 13-18 enrolled in school
Dorms Per Capita
Share of Rooms with Good Quality 
Floors
Water in Terrain
House with Own Toilet
Connected to Sewage Service 
Refrigerator
T.V. 
*Significant at 10% level. **Significant at 5% level. ***Significant at 1% level  
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Variable
(1) Mean of 
Obervations  
Poor Out of 
Slums  (ECH 
2008) b
(2) Mean of 
Observations 
Settlements 
(ECH 2008)
Difference    
(1)-(2)
Income Indicators (HH)
Monthly Income Per Capita (USD) c 77.561 132.936 -55.376
(0.627) (3.475) (3.364)***
Employment Indicators (IND)
Employment rate 16-64 0.584 0.647 -0.063
(0.004) (0.007) (0.007)***
Employment rate Males 16-64 0.337 0.388 -0.051
(0.009) (0.006) (0.010)***
Employment rate Females 16-64 0.247 0.260 -0.012
(0.011) (0.006) (0.011)
Wage employment rate 16-64 0.404 0.467 -0.063
(0.005) (0.008) (0.009)***
Wage employment rate Males 16-64 0.225 0.271 -0.046
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009)***
Wage employment rate Females 16-64 0.178 0.196 -0.017
(0.010) (0.006) (0.012)
Self employment rate 16-64 0.181 0.180 0.000
(0.003) (0.007) (0.008)
Self employment rate Males 16-64 0.112 0.116 -0.005
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Self employment rate Females 16-64 0.069 0.064 0.005
(0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
Average Wage Males 16-64 c 187.336 260.234 -72.899
(6.969) (5.858) (9.489)***
Average Wage Females 16-64 c 74.283 108.738 -34.455
(2.086) (4.156) (3.657)***
b The term "national poor" refers to households whose members are below the national poverty 
line in urban zones in Uruguay. This line is calculated monthly; in 2008, it ranged between USD 
213 and USD 234 per capita per month. The poverty line represents a basic basket of "staple 
food needs" plus a basic basket of "non-food needs", both calculated using 2006 as the base 
year.
*Significant at 10% level. **Significant at 5% level. ***Significant at 1% level  
Table 7c. Differences of Means between Poors, 
Non Poors and Slum Dwellers. Uruguay 
(Montevideo and Canelones Departments)a
a Figures computed at household and individual levels in Montevideo and Canelones provinces 
(known as "departments") in Uruguay using the 2008 continuous household survey (ECH). 
Standard errors are clustered at the primary sample unit level shown in parentheses. 
c In US dollars of December 2008. In the case of monetary variables, observations over the 99th 
percentile were excluded.
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Variable
(1) Mean of 
Obervations  Poor 
Out of Slums  (ECH 
2008) b
(2) Mean of 
Observations 
Settlements 
(ECH 2008)
Difference 
(1) - (2)
Demographics
HH Size 4.274 3.691 0.584
(0.091) (0.053) (0.118)***
Female Head 0.378 0.372 0.005
(0.038) (0.013) (0.039)
Head of HH's Age 45.311 45.423 -0.112
(0.213) (0.352) (0.395)
Head of HH's Years of Schooling 6.351 6.169 0.182
(0.190) (0.099) (0.140)
Children 5-12 enrolled in school 0.980 0.978 0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Children 13-18 enrolled in school 0.707 0.661 0.046
(0.011) (0.019) (0.024)*
Housing and Assets
Rooms Per Capita 0.836 0.977 -0.141
(0.024) (0.020) (0.039)***
Share of Rooms with Good Quality Floors 0.758 0.596 0.162
(0.010) (0.017) (0.016)***
Water in Terrain 0.864 0.989 -0.125
(0.061) (0.004) (0.057)**
House with Own Toilet 0.922 0.895 0.027
(0.006) (0.009) (0.012)**
Connected to Sewage Service 0.543 0.604 -0.061
(0.033) (0.023) (0.025)**
0.988 0.996 -0.008
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003)**
Refrigerator 0.886 0.860 0.027
(0.006) (0.011) (0.011)**
T.V. 0.939 0.919 0.020
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009)**
Table 7d. Differences of Means between Poors, 
Non Poors and Slum Dwellers. Uruguay 
(Montevideo and Canelones Departments)a
a Figures computed at household and individual levels in Montevideo and Canelones provinces 
(known as "departments") in Uruguay using the 2008 continuous household survey (ECH). 
Standard errors are clustered at the primary sample unit level shown in parentheses.  
b The term "national poor" refers to households whose members are below the national poverty line 
in urban zones in Uruguay. This line is calculated monthly; in 2008, it ranged between USD 213 and 
USD 234 per capita per month. The poverty line represents a basic basket of "staple food needs" 
plus a basic basket of "non-food needs", both calculated using 2006 as the base year.
*Significant at 10% level. **Significant at 5% level. ***Significant at 1% level  
Electricity Connection inside the House 
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Variable
(1) Mean  Poor  
(ENIGH 2010) b
(2) Mean All Slums 
(UTPMP 2010 - 11)
Difference 
(1) - (2)
Difference 
(1) - (2)d
Income Indicators (HH)
Monthly Income Per Capita (USD) c 86.274 107.674 -21.399 -34.770
(1.629) (6.073) (6.218)*** (9.504)***
Employment Indicators (IND)
Employment rate 16-64 0.877 0.563 0.315 0.278
(0.010) (0.009) (0.014)*** (0.017)***
Employment rate Males 16-64 0.529 0.406 0.124 0.104
(0.015) (0.007) (0.017)*** (0.026)**
Employment rate Females 16-64 0.348 0.157 0.191 0.174
(0.013) (0.008) (0.016)*** (0.022)***
Wage employment rate 16-64 0.621 0.509 0.113 0.064
(0.020) (0.011) (0.023)*** (0.037)*
Wage employment rate Males 16-64 0.387 0.378 0.009 -0.012
(0.014) (0.010) (0.017) (0.023)
Wage employment rate Females 16-64 0.234 0.130 0.104 0.075
(0.013) (0.007) (0.015)*** (0.021)***
Self employment rate 16-64 0.252 0.049 0.203 0.214
(0.016) (0.008) (0.018)*** (0.028)***
Self employment rate Males 16-64 0.140 0.024 0.116 0.116
(0.010) (0.005) (0.011)*** (0.013)***
Self employment rate Females 16-64 0.112 0.025 0.087 0.098
(0.015) (0.004) (0.015)*** (0.031)***
Average Wage Males 16-64 c 237.071 252.964 -15.893 -30.158
(4.699) (7.439) (8.725)* (8.264)***
Average Wage Females 16-64 c 152.216 253.512 -101.295 -110.316
(4.922) (20.365) (20.726)*** (36.068)***
Table 7e. Differences of Means between Poors, Non Poors and 
Slum Dwellers. Mexico (Estado de Mexico)a
a Figures computed at household and individual levels in Estado de Mexico, Mexico, using the 2010 national 
household income and expenditure survey (ENIGH) and UTPMP impact evaluation baseline data sources 
(including non-eligible UTPMP households). Standard errors are clustered at the primary sample unit level 
shown in parentheses. 
b The term "national poor" refers to households whose members were living on less than USD 167.67 per 
capita per month in urban zones and less than USD 107.29 in rural zones between August and November 2010; 
these figures are equivalent to two basic baskets, which represent the national poverty line and basic needs in 
Mexico as of 2010.
c In the case of monetary variables, observations over the 99th percentile were excluded.
d Since price levels in urban and rural zones in Mexico differ, in this column we test the hypothesis of equal 
means by controlling for a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the household is located in a rural zone.
*Significant at 10% level. **Significant at 5% level. ***Significant at 1% level  
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Variable
(1) Mean  Poor  
(ENIGH 2010) b
(2) Mean All Slums 
(UTPMP 2010 - 11)
Difference   
(1) - (2)
Difference      
(1) - (2)c
Demographics
HH Size 4.658 4.721 -0.063 0.013
(0.074) (0.148) (0.164) (0.182)
Female Head 0.208 0.201 0.006 0.017
(0.012) (0.014) (0.018) (0.023)
Head of HH's Age 46.130 43.537 2.592 2.580
(0.512) (0.711) (0.870)*** (1.159)**
Head of HH's Years of Schooling 6.897 5.214 1.682 1.134
(0.165) (0.227) (0.279)*** (0.431)***
Children 5-12 enrolled in school 0.980 0.966 0.015 0.005
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.014)
Children 13-18 enrolled in school 0.632 0.430 0.202 0.148
(0.025) (0.030) (0.039)*** (0.061)**
Housing and Assets
Rooms Per Capita 0.921 0.854 0.067 0.034
(0.022) (0.023) (0.032)** (0.045)
Share of Rooms with Good Quality Floors 0.959 0.738 0.220 0.227
(0.006) (0.019) (0.020)*** (0.034)***
Water in Terrain 0.926 0.574 0.353 0.331
(0.014) (0.050) (0.051)*** (0.098)***
House with Own Toilet 0.835 0.481 0.354 0.310
(0.012) (0.032) (0.034)*** (0.044)***
Connected to Sewage Service 0.903 0.311 0.592 0.450
(0.018) (0.048) (0.051)*** (0.057)***
0.988 0.885 0.103 0.071
(0.003) (0.022) (0.022)*** (0.023)***
Refrigerator 0.700 0.195 0.504 0.296
(0.024) (0.034) (0.041)*** (0.070)***
T.V. 0.953 0.640 0.313 0.223
(0.010) (0.039) (0.040)*** (0.048)***
*Significant at 10% level. **Significant at 5% level. ***Significant at 1% level  
Table 7f. Differences of Means between Poors, Non Poors and Slum 
Dwellers. Mexico (Estado de Mexico)a
Electricity Connection inside the House 
a Figures computed at household and individual levels in Estado de Mexico, Mexico, using the 2010 national household 
income and expenditure survey (ENIGH) and UTPMP impact evaluation baseline data sources (including non-eligible 
UTPMP households). Standard errors are clustered at the primary sample unit level shown in parentheses. 
b The term "national poor" refers to households whose members were living on less than USD 167.67 per capita per 
month in urban zones and less than USD 107.29 in rural zones between August and November 2010; these figures are 
equivalent to two basic baskets, which represent the national poverty line and basic needs in Mexico as of 2010.
c Since price levels in urban and rural zones in Mexico differ, in this column we test the hypothesis of equal means by 
controlling for a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the household is located in a rural zone.
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El Salvador Mexico Uruguay
Phase 1 - Construction
September, 
2008 - 
January, 2010
May - July, 
2010
November, 
2007 - 
January, 2008
Phase 2 - Construction
April - 
September,    
2008
October, 
2010 January, 
2011
August - 
October, 2008
Follow-Up Survey
September - 
October, 
2009
February - 
April, 2012 
January - 
March, 2010 
Table A1. Timeline of Intervention and Surveys
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Variable Description Obs. 
Control
Obs. 
Treatment
Obs. 
Control
Obs. 
Treatment
Obs. 
Control
Obs. 
Treatment
Obs. 
Control
Obs. 
Treatment
Monthly Income Per Capita  
(USD)
Monthly Income per capita in US dollars of July 2007. It is 
calculated as the sum of the monthly earnings of each 
household's member divided by the household size. 
200 324 258 386 339 360 797 1,070
Assets Value Per Capita (USD) Total Asset Value per capita reported by the household. 258 398 282 446 401 425 941 1,269
Newborns (<1) Number of individuals below 1 year old by household. 258 398 282 446 401 425 941 1,269
Newborns (<2) Number of individuals below 2 year old by household. 258 398 282 446 401 425 941 1,269
Age Age in years for all the individual. 1,402 2,215 1,393 2,320 2,082 2,231 4,877 6,766
Age in Months Age in months for children below 5 years old. 156 235 215 391 265 293 636 919
Head of HH's Age Age of head of household in years. 257 397 281 443 392 412 930 1,252
Spouse's Age Age of the spouse or partner of head of household in 
years.
180 292 174 250 291 314 645 856
Gender Indicator equal to one if the individual is a man. 1,407 2,217 1,397 2,342 2,111 2,273 4,915 6,832
Head of HH's Gender Indicator equal to one if the head of household is a man. 258 397 282 446 401 425 941 1,268
Years of Schooling (6-12 years 
old)
Years of schooling if individual is between 6 and 12 years 
old.
214 366 286 472 367 430 867 1,268
Years of Schooling (13-18 years 
old)
Years of schooling if individual is between 13 and 18 years 
old.
226 337 176 315 273 327 675 979
Head of HH's Years of Schooling Years of Schooling of head of household equivalent to the 
higher level of education reached. 
254 387 272 435 396 421 922 1,243
Spouse's Years of Schooling Years of Schooling of the spouse or partner of head of 
household equivalent to the higher level of education 
reached. 
178 287 168 242 293 321 639 850
Hours worked last week by Head 
of HH
Number of hours worked by the head of household at main 
and secondary job during the last week, conditional on 
having worked during the last week.
160 265 240 388 299 320 699 973
Hours worked last week by 
Spouse 
Number of hours worked by the spouse or partner of head 
of household at main and secondary job during the last 
week, conditioned on having worked during the last week.
35 80 117 169 98 120 250 369
HH Size Number of individuals living in the house. 258 398 282 446 401 425 941 1,269
Members per Household (<5) Number of individuals below 5 years old living in the house. 258 398 282 446 401 425 941 1,269
Members per Household (6-12) Number of individuals between 6 and 12 years old living in 
the house.
258 398 282 446 401 425 941 1,269
Members per Household (13-18) Number of individuals between 13 and 18 years old living 
in the house.
258 398 282 446 401 425 941 1,269
Members per Household (>18) Number of individuals over 18 years old living in the house. 258 398 282 446 401 425 941 1,269
Number of Rooms Number of rooms in the terrain (observed by the 
enumerator).
258 398 278 444 401 424 937 1,266
Share of Rooms with Good 
Quality Floors
Proportion of rooms with floors made of good quality 
materials like cement, brick, or wood (observed by the 
enumerator).
258 398 278 444 401 424 937 1,266
Share of Rooms with Good 
Quality Walls
Proportion of rooms with walls made of good quality 
materials like wood, cement, brick or zinc metal (observed 
by the enumerator).
258 398 282 446 397 424 937 1,268
Share of Rooms with Good 
Quality Roofs
Proportion of rooms with roofs made of good quality 
materials like cement, brick, tile and zinc metal (observed 
by the enumerator).
258 398 279 444 401 424 938 1,266
Share of Rooms with Window Proportion of rooms with at least 1 window (observed by 
the enumerator).
258 398 282 446 400 424 940 1,268
Water in Terrain Indicator equal to one if there is access to drinkable or not 
drinkable water in the terrain where the house is located 
(observed by the enumerator).
258 398 282 446 401 425 941 1,269
House with Own Toilet Indicator equal to one if there is a toilet inside or outside 
the house, but inside the terrain (observed by the 
enumerator).
258 398 282 446 401 425 941 1,269
El Salvador Uruguay Mexico All
Table A2a: Description of Variables and Sample Sizes. Intention to Treat Groups. Follow Up Survey
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Variable Description Obs. 
Control
Obs. 
Treatment
Obs. 
Control
Obs. 
Treatment
Obs. 
Control
Obs. 
Treatment
Obs. 
Control
Obs. 
Treatment
Electricity Connection 
inside the House 
Indicator equal to one if there is a formal or informal 
connection to the electricity system inside the house 
(observed by the enumerator).
258 398 282 446 400 425 940 1,269
Sink on Room where food 
is prepared 
Indicator equal to one if there is a sink inside the 
room where food is prepared (observed by the 
enumerator).
258 398 275 442 398 423 931 1,263
Use Gas Stove or 
Kerosene to Cook 
Indicator equal to one if the household reports the use 
of gas stove or kerosene to cook.
258 398 282 446 401 425 941 1,269
Refrigerator Indicator equal to one if the enumerator observes and 
the household reports having a refrigerator.
235 352 271 432 401 425 907 1,209
T.V. Indicator equal to one if the enumerator observes and 
the household reports having a television.
235 352 271 432 401 425 907 1,209
Fan Indicator equal to one if the enumerator observes and 
the household reports having a fan.
235 352 271 432 400 425 906 1,209
Kitchen or Gas Stove Indicator equal to one if the enumerator observes and 
the household reports having a kitchen or gas stove.
235 352 271 432 401 425 907 1,209
Bicycle Indicator equal to one if the enumerator observes and 
the household reports having a bicycle.
235 352 271 432 401 425 907 1,209
Satisfaction with Floor 
Quality
Indicator equal to one if the respondent reports being 
satisfied or very satisfied with the quality of floors, 
measured by a Likert scale of 4 categories that goes 
from "unsitisfied" to "very satisfied".
258 398 277 441 401 424 936 1,263
Satisfaction with Wall 
Quality
Indicator equal to one if the respondent reports being 
satisfied or very satisfied with the quality of walls, 
measured by a Likert scale of 4 categories that goes 
from "unsitisfied" to "very satisfied".
258 398 277 441 401 425 936 1,264
Satisfaction with Roof 
Quality
Indicator equal to one if the respondent reports being 
satisfied or very satisfied with the quality of roofs, 
measured by a Likert scale of 4 categories that goes 
from "unsitisfied" to "very satisfied".
258 398 277 441 401 425 936 1,264
Satisfaction with House 
Protection against Water 
when it rains
Indicator equal to one if respondent reports being 
satisfied or very satisfied with the protection against 
water when it rains, measured by a Likert scale of 4 
categories that goes from "unsitisfied" to "very 
satisfied".
258 398 277 441 401 425 936 1,264
Satisfaction with Quality of 
Life
Indicator equal to one if respondent reports being 
satisfied or very satisfied with the quality of life, 
measured by a Likert scale of 4 categories that goes 
from "unsitisfied" to "very satisfied".
154 367 276 439 400 422 830 1,228
Safe inside the house 
during the last 12 months 
Indicator equal to one if respondent has never or 
rarely felt unsafe inside the house during the last 12 
months, measured by a Likert scale of 5 categories 
that goes from "never unsafe" to "always unsafe".
258 398 282 446 401 425 941 1,269
Safe leaving the house 
alone during the last 12 
months 
Indicator equal to one if respondent has never or 
rarely felt unsafe leaving the house alone during the 
last 12 months.
258 398 282 446 401 425 941 1,269
Safe leaving the kids alone 
in the house during the last 
12 months 
Indicator equal to one if respondent feels safe or very 
safe leaving the kids alone in the house during the 
last 12 months, , measured by a Likert scale of 5 
categories that goes from "never unsafe" to "always 
unsafe".
258 398 282 446 401 425 941 1,269
The house had been 
robbed in the last 12 
months 
Indicator equal to one if respondent reports the house 
has been robbed during the last 12 months.
258 398 276 441 400 425 934 1,264
Respiratory Disease during 
last 4 weeks  
Indicator equal to one if the mother reports that a child 
below 5 years old had a respiratory disease in the 
last four weeks.
155 229 211 374 259 283 625 886
Diarrhea during last 4 
weeks
Indicator equal to one if the mother reports that a
child below 5 years old had diarrhea in the last four 
weeks.
155 229 209 374 259 277 623 880
Table A2b: Description of Variables and Sample Sizes. Intention to Treat Groups. Follow Up Survey
El Salvador Uruguay Mexico All
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Variable Description Obs. 
Control
Obs. 
Treatment
Obs. 
Control
Obs. 
Treatment
Obs. 
Control
Obs. 
Treatment
Obs. 
Control
Obs. 
Treatment
Housing Quality Summary 
Index (z-score)
Equally weighted average of z-scores of Number of 
Rooms, Share of Rooms with Good Quality Floors, 
Share of Rooms with Good Quality Walls, Share of 
Rooms with Good Quality Roofs, and Share of 
Rooms with Window. 
258 398 282 446 401 425 941 1,269
Housing Investment 
Summary Index (z-score)
Equally weighted average of z-scores of Sink on 
Room where food is prepared, Room where food is 
prepared is also used as Bedroom, Water in Terrain, 
Electricity Connection inside the House, Use Gas 
Stove or Kerosene to Cook, and House with Own 
Toilet.
258 398 274 446 401 425 933 1,269
Satisfaction Summary Index 
(z-score)
Equally weighted average of z-scores of Satisfaction 
with Floor Quality, Satisfaction with Wall Quality, 
Satisfaction with Roof Quality,  Satisfaction with 
House Protection against Water when it rains, and 
Satisfaction of Quality of Life. 
258 398 282 446 401 425 941 1,269
Perception of Security 
Summary Index (z-score)
Equally weighted average of z-scores of Safe inside 
the house during the last 12 months, Safe leaving the 
house alone during the last 12 months, Safe leaving 
the kids alone in the house during the last 12 months, 
and The house had been robbed in the last 12 
months. 
258 398 276 446 401 425 935 1,269
Assets Summary Index (z-
score)
Equally weighted average of z-scores of Television, 
Fun, Kitchen or Gas Stove, Refrigerator, and Bicycle.
258 398 282 446 401 425 941 1,269
Economic Summary Index 
(z-score)
Equally weighted average of z-scores of Monthly 
Income Per Capita (USD), Hours worked last week 
by Head of HH, and Hours worked last week by 
Spouse.
258 398 282 446 401 425 941 1,269
Demographic Summary 
Index (z-score)
Equally weighted average of z-scores of HHSize, 
Newborns(<1), and Newborns(<2).
258 398 282 446 401 425 941 1,269
Health Summary Index (z-
score)
Equally weighted average of z-scores of Respiratory 
Disease during last 4 weeks and Diarrhea during last 
4 weeks. 
155 229 208 374 259 283 622 886
Table A2c: Description of Variables and Sample Sizes. Intention to Treat Groups. Follow Up Survey
El Salvador Uruguay Mexico All
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Observations 
Treatment
Observations 
Control
Mean 
Differences
Observations 
Treatment
Observations 
Control
Mean 
Differences
Observations 
Treatment
Observations 
Control
Mean 
Differences
Observations 
Treatment
Observations 
Control
Mean 
Differences
General Information
N° Households 421 277 478 301 457 439 1,356 1,017
60.32% 39.68% 61.36% 38.64% 51.00% 49.00% 57.14% 42.86%
N° Individuals 2,111 1,363 2,067 1,259 2,239 2,152 6,417 4,774
60.77% 39.23% 62.15% 37.85% 50.99% 49.01% 57.34% 42.66%
Attriters: N° 
Households
23 19 32 19 32 38 87 76
Attrition Rate 0.055 0.069 -0.014 0.067 0.063 0.004 0.070 0.087 -0.017 0.064 0.075 -0.011
(0.011) (0.015) (0.018) (0.011) (0.014) (0.018) (0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010)
N° Households - 
Follow Up Sample
398 258 446 282 425 401 1,269 941
Phase I 221 67 224 129 166 120 611 316
Phase II 177 191 222 153 259 281 658 625
N° Individuals - Follow 
Up Sample
2,217 1,407 2,342 1,397 2,273 2,111 6,832 4,915
Compliers: N° 
Households
349 257 383 280 368 401 1,100 938
87.7% 99.6% 85.9% 99.3% 86.6% 100.0% 86.7% 99.7%
Non Compliance Rate 0.123 0.004 0.119 0.141 0.007 0.134 0.134 0.000 0.134 0.133 0.003 0.130
(0.016) (0.003) (0.016)*** (0.016) (0.005) (0.017)*** (0.016) (0.000) (0.016)*** (0.009) (0.001) (0.009)***
Moversa 20 16 36 25 22 22 78 63
4.75% 5.78% 7.53% 8.31% 4.81% 5.01% 5.75% 6.19%
Movers Rate 0.048 0.058 -0.010 0.075 0.083 -0.008 0.048 0.050 -0.002 0.058 0.062 -0.004
(0.010) (0.014) (0.017) (0.012) (0.015) (0.019) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
a The term "movers" refers to households whose members moved out of the original slum between the times that the baseline and the follow-up surveys were conducted. Some of these people were located 
and responded to the follow-up survey; those who were not located have been classified as attriters.
*Significant at 10% level. **Significant at 5% level. ***Significant at 1% level.  
All
Table A3. General Information. Intention to Treat Groups  a
MexicoEl Salvador Uruguay
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Variables
Mean 
Treatment
Mean 
Control
Mean 
Differences 
Mean 
Treatment
Mean 
Control
Mean 
Differences 
Mean 
Treatment
Mean 
Control
Mean 
Differences
Mean 
Treatment
Mean 
Control
Mean 
Differences 
Income and Assets
45.397 53.578 6.059 45.369 47.694 -1.599 48.772 50.265 1.048 45.177 48.745 -0.311
(5.539) (8.126) (11.900) (3.558) (4.677) (6.452) (4.527) (4.111) (6.104) (2.365) (2.764) (3.911)
29.940 30.463 -1.713 64.899 77.871 -15.626 56.281 67.969 -6.209 51.210 59.118 -6.453
(1.413) (1.893) (2.855) (4.179) (6.834) (9.275)* (2.965) (3.664) (4.744) (1.826) (2.425) (3.521)*
0.453 0.412 -0.028 0.844 0.825 0.019 0.604 0.677 -0.039 0.643 0.651 -0.017
(0.025) (0.030) (0.044) (0.016) (0.022) (0.029) (0.022) (0.022) (0.031) (0.013) (0.015) (0.019)
0.043 0.050 0.004 0.291 0.264 0.037 0.033 0.023 0.005 0.127 0.101 0.016
(0.010) (0.013) (0.022) (0.021) (0.025) (0.034) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013)
0.455 0.527 -0.030 0.651 0.664 0.022 0.418 0.474 -0.027 0.511 0.544 -0.012
(0.025) (0.030) (0.044) (0.022) (0.027) (0.036) (0.023) (0.023) (0.029) (0.013) (0.015) (0.020)
0.059 0.099 -0.018 0.495 0.510 0.011 0.204 0.187 0.014 0.263 0.259 0.006
(0.011) (0.018) (0.026) (0.023) (0.029) (0.039) (0.018) (0.018) (0.024) (0.012) (0.013) (0.018)
0.335 0.359 -0.014 0.453 0.462 -0.011 0.269 0.269 0.010 0.354 0.349 -0.003
(0.023) (0.029) (0.041) (0.023) (0.029) (0.039) (0.020) (0.021) (0.029) (0.013) (0.015) 0.020)
Characteristics of the House
2.488 2.354 -0.146 2.912 2.837 0.105 2.803 2.825 -0.023 2.743 2.700 -0.010
(0.056) (0.069) (0.095) (0.068) (0.087) (0.117) (0.061) (0.059) (0.085) (0.036) (0.041) (0.058)
0.145 0.142 -0.038 0.371 0.374 -0.020 0.661 0.636 0.012 0.398 0.423 -0.011
(0.011) (0.014) (0.021)* (0.020) (0.025) (0.033) (0.017) (0.018) (0.024) (0.011) (0.013) (0.016)
0.110 0.107 -0.021 0.248 0.217 0.022 0.259 0.237 0.022 0.204 0.193 0.010
(0.010) (0.012) (0.018) (0.021) (0.026) (0.035) (0.017) (0.016) (0.021) (0.009) (0.010) (0.014)
0.101 0.149 -0.016 0.348 0.353 -0.023 0.502 0.468 -0.013 0.322 0.347 -0.017
(0.012) (0.019) (0.023) (0.019) (0.025) (0.033) (0.019) (0.019) (0.027) (0.011) (0.013) (0.016)
0.154 0.184 0.002 0.561 0.586 -0.026 0.294 0.253 0.015 0.345 0.333 -0.002
(0.012) (0.018) (0.024) (0.017) (0.022) (0.029) (0.016) (0.015) (0.022) (0.010) (0.011) (0.014)
0.228 0.195 -0.033 0.916 0.907 0.016 0.501 0.519 0.015 0.563 0.546 0.004
(0.020) (0.023) (0.030) (0.012) (0.016) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.028) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
0.014 0.007 0.002 0.269 0.231 0.047 0.013 0.025 -0.011 0.103 0.081 0.012
(0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.020) (0.024) (0.033) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012)
0.394 0.386 -0.063 0.962 0.953 0.008 0.807 0.870 -0.041 0.734 0.763 -0.030
(0.023) (0.029) (0.038) (0.008) (0.012) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.023)* (0.012) (0.013) (0.014)**
0.195 0.141 0.010 0.439 0.475 -0.017 0.276 0.280 -0.008 0.308 0.300 -0.007
(0.019) (0.020) (0.030) (0.022) (0.028) (0.037) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.012) (0.014) (0.017)
0.506 0.448 -0.056 0.657 0.598 0.062 0.403 0.392 -0.011 0.524 0.468 0.003
(0.024) (0.029) (0.042) (0.021) (0.028) (0.036)* (0.022) (0.023) (0.031) (0.013) (0.015) (0.020)
All
Table A4a. Differences in Pre-Treatment Means. Intention to Treat Groups. Baseline Survey. a
a Responses regarding construction materials used in rooms were included only for those households that reported information for all rooms. In the case of monetary variables, observations over the 99th 
percentile were excluded. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
*Significant at 10% level. **Significant at 5% level. ***Significant at 1% level  
MexicoEl Salvador Uruguay
House with Own Toilet
Use Gas Stove or Kerosene to 
Cook
Electricity Connection inside the 
House 
Sink on Room where food is 
prepared
Water in Terrain
Share of Rooms with Window
Share of Rooms with Good 
Quality Roofs
Share of Rooms with Good  
Quality Walls
Fan
T.V.
Monthly Income Per Capita 
(USD)
Assets Value Per Capita (USD)
Share of Rooms with Good 
Quality Floors
Number of Rooms
Bicycle
Refrigerator
Kitchen or Gas Stove
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Variables
Mean 
Treatment
Mean 
Control
Mean 
Differences 
Mean 
Treatment
Mean Control
Mean 
Differences 
Mean 
Treatment
Mean 
Control
Mean 
Differences 
Mean 
Treatment
Mean 
Control
Mean 
Differences 
Satisfaction with Quality of House and 
0.133 0.116 0.018 0.164 0.196 -0.020 0.375 0.377 0.036 0.225 0.252 0.013
(0.016) (0.019) (0.027) (0.016) (0.022) (0.030) (0.022) (0.023) (0.030) (0.011) (0.013) (0.017)
0.095 0.083 0.004 0.117 0.130 -0.012 0.255 0.249 0.030 0.157 0.169 0.010
(0.014) (0.016) (0.025) (0.014) (0.019) (0.026) (0.020) (0.020) (0.029) (0.009) (0.011) (0.016)
0.117 0.091 0.008 0.176 0.157 0.000 0.212 0.229 0.002 0.163 0.176 0.003
(0.015) (0.017) (0.026) (0.021) (0.016) (0.028) (0.019) (0.020) (0.028) (0.010) (0.011) (0.016)
0.103 0.090 -0.005 0.159 0.180 -0.006 0.190 0.176 0.038 0.152 0.154 0.013
(0.014) (0.017) (0.025) (0.016) (0.022) (0.029) (0.018) (0.018) (0.025) (0.009) (0.011) (0.016)
0.266 0.181 0.025 0.219 0.229 -0.020 0.354 0.339 0.036 0.279 0.263 0.015
(0.021) (0.023) (0.033) (0.019) (0.024) (0.032) (0.022) (0.022) (0.032) (0.012) (0.013) (0.019)
0.527 0.538 -0.045 0.615 0.595 0.029 0.713 0.708 0.013 0.621 0.628 0.004
(0.024) (0.030) (0.043) (0.022) (0.028) (0.037) (0.021) (0.021) (0.031) (0.013) (0.015) (0.020)
0.435 0.419 -0.011 0.328 0.272 0.061 0.615 0.597 0.031 0.458 0.452 0.031
(0.024) (0.029) (0.043) (0.021) (0.025) (0.035)* (0.022) (0.023) (0.032) (0.013) (0.015) (0.020)
0.147 0.166 -0.049 0.144 0.126 0.011 0.166 0.191 -0.034 0.153 0.165 -0.023
(0.017) (0.022) (0.032) (0.016) (0.019) (0.025) (0.017) (0.018) (0.026) (0.009) (0.011) (0.016)
0.079 0.036 0.053 0.273 0.283 -0.030 0.059 0.055 0.008 0.141 0.117 0.006
(0.013) (0.011) (0.020)** (0.020) (0.026) (0.033) (0.011) (0.010) (0.015) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013)
HH Size 5.014 4.921 -0.040 4.324 4.183 0.109 4.899 4.902 -0.099 4.732 4.694 -0.015
(0.124) (0.140) (0.233) (0.113) (0.134) (0.189) (0.113) (0.117) (0.159) (0.068) (0.075) (0.108)
Newborns (<1) 0.114 0.123 -0.013 0.178 0.150 0.010 0.118 0.153 -0.040 0.138 0.144 -0.017
(0.016) (0.021) (0.030) (0.018) (0.021) (0.029) (0.015) (0.017) (0.024) (0.009) (0.011) (0.016)
Newborns (<2) 0.214 0.220 -0.025 0.343 0.312 0.007 0.284 0.276 -0.008 0.283 0.271 -0.007
(0.021) (0.026) (0.037) (0.025) (0.030) (0.041) (0.022) (0.024) (0.034) (0.013) (0.015) (0.022)
Members per Household (<5) 0.622 0.606 0.016 0.828 0.794 -0.007 0.622 0.606 -0.086 0.769 0.782 -0.035
(0.036) (0.046) (0.068) (0.044) (0.055) (0.074) (0.036) (0.046) (0.063) (0.024) (0.028) (0.040)
Members per Household (6-12) 1.043 0.993 -0.059 0.831 0.731 0.137 1.043 0.993 0.026 0.965 0.905 0.043
(0.054) (0.064) (0.096) (0.048) (0.055) (0.077)* (0.054) (0.064) (0.074) (0.030) (0.033) (0.047)
Members per Household (13-18) 0.660 0.675 -0.023 0.542 0.455 0.093 0.660 0.675 -0.013 0.650 0.636 0.020
(0.044) (0.051) (0.080) (0.038) (0.046) (0.064) (0.044) (0.051) (0.065) (0.024) (0.028) (0.040)
Members per Household (>18) 2.437 2.350 0.076 1.856 1.947 -0.114 2.437 2.350 -0.029 2.172 2.213 -0.032
(0.057) (0.065) (0.111) (0.037) (0.050) (0.068)* (0.057) (0.065) (0.075) (0.029) (0.032) (0.047)
Head of HH's Age 45.038 44.227 0.129 38.723 37.270 1.827 41.518 41.379 0.426 41.627 40.935 0.824
(0.819) (1.013) (1.555) (0.649) (0.806) (1.089)* (0.747) (0.697) (0.999) (0.430) (0.479) (0.673)
Head of HH's Gender 0.798 0.769 0.028 0.498 0.545 -0.046 0.788 0.770 0.018 0.689 0.703 -0.001
(0.019) (0.025) (0.036) (0.022) (0.028) (0.038) (0.019) (0.020) (0.028) (0.012) (0.014) (0.019)
Head of HH's Years of Schooling 2.514 2.326 -0.053 5.828 5.877 0.121 4.144 3.850 0.305 4.091 3.741 0.281
(0.147) (0.170) (0.245) (0.135) (0.183) (0.237) (0.151) (0.151) (0.203) (0.099) (0.105) (0.140)**
Spouse's Age 38.909 37.900 0.274 33.623 33.036 0.595 37.110 37.731 0.065 36.727 36.514 0.270
(0.852) (1.047) (1.609) (0.754) (0.927) (1.263) (0.744) (0.757) (1.045) (0.460) (0.519) (0.725)
Spouse's Years of Schooling 2.210 1.921 0.127 6.023 6.229 -0.185 4.120 4.274 -0.320 3.889 3.867 -0.081
(0.166) (0.180) (0.265) (0.179) (0.225) (0.304) (0.178) (0.177) (0.237) (0.123) (0.133) (0.168)
Hours worked last week by Head of HH 41.278 40.963 1.373 38.610 40.258 -1.744 40.924 40.785 0.606 40.182 40.662 -0.046
(1.230) (1.461) (2.306) (1.113) (1.437) (1.910) (1.150) (1.140) (1.623) (0.671) (0.764) (1.092)
Hours worked last week by Spouse 34.261 26.340 4.137 37.159 37.438 0.267 28.122 28.113 -2.283 33.370 31.377 -0.250
(2.872) (3.035) (4.392) (1.845) (1.775) (2.759) (1.864) (1.865) (2.699) (1.225) (1.225) (1.786)
Years of Schooling (6-12 years old) 1.594 1.601 -0.090 1.900 2.012 -0.044 2.494 2.401 0.055 1.999 2.053 -0.013
(0.076) (0.096) (0.145) (0.077) (0.104) (0.140) (0.087) (0.090) (1.678) (0.047) (0.057) (0.080)
Years of Schooling (13-18 years old) 5.248 5.049 -0.134 5.373 5.535 -0.101 6.627 7.038 -0.366 5.795 6.088 -0.228
(0.145) (0.183) (0.268) (0.113) (0.152) (0.197) (0.116) (0.122) (0.171)** (0.076) (0.093) (0.118)*
Health (<5 years old)
0.669 0.635 0.042 0.351 0.352 -0.018 0.376 0.401 -0.022 0.444 0.439 -0.007
(0.029) (0.037) (0.056) (0.024) (0.031) (0.042) (0.027) (0.027) (0.040) (0.016) (0.018) (0.025)
0.249 0.144 0.043 0.087 0.089 -0.018 0.131 0.138 -0.011 0.145 0.123 -0.002
(0.027) (0.027) (0.042) (0.014) (0.018) (0.024) (0.018) (0.019) (0.028) (0.011) (0.012) (0.017)
All
Table A4b. Differences in Pre-Treatment Means. Intention to Treat Groups. Baseline Survey. a
a Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
*Significant at 10% level. **Significant at 5% level. ***Significant at 1% level  
Mexico
Satisfaction with Roof Quality
Satisfaction with House Protection 
against Water when it rains
Satisfaction with Quality of Life
Sociodemographic Characteristics
El Salvador Uruguay
Perception of Security
Diarrhea during last 4 weeks
Respiratory Disease during last 4 weeks
House robbed in the last 12 months
Safe leaving the kids alone in the house 
during the last 12 months
Safe leaving the house alone during the 
last 12 months
Safe inside the house during the last 12 
months
Satisfaction with Floor Quality
Satisfaction with Wall Quality
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Variables
Mean 
El Salvador 
(1)
Mean 
Uruguay     
(2)
Mean 
Mexico     
(3)
Mean 
Differences 
(1) - (2)
Mean 
Differences 
(1) - (3)
Mean 
Differences 
(2) - (3)
Characteristics of the House
2.435 2.883 2.814 -0.448 -0.379 0.069
(0.087) (0.079) (0.065) (0.116)*** (0.108)*** (0.101)
0.144 0.372 0.649 -0.228 -0.505 -0.276
(0.014) (0.030) (0.027) (0.033)*** (0.031)*** (0.040)***
0.109 0.236 0.248 -0.127 -0.140 -0.012
(0.013) (0.033) (0.031) (0.035)*** (0.034)*** (0.045)
0.120 0.350 0.485 -0.230 -0.365 -0.135
(0.034) (0.024) (0.031) (0.041)*** (0.046)*** (0.039)***
0.166 0.571 0.273 -0.405 -0.107 0.298
(0.017) (0.016) (0.025) (0.023)*** (0.030)*** (0.029)***
0.215 0.913 0.510 -0.700 -0.295 0.403
(0.051) (0.014) (0.052) (0.053)*** (0.072)*** (0.054)***
0.012 0.254 0.019 -0.242 -0.008 0.235
(0.005) (0.025) (0.004) (0.024)*** (0.007) (0.024)***
0.313 0.432 0.229 -0.119 0.084 0.203
(0.047) (0.025) (0.025) (0.053)** (0.053) (0.035)***
0.391 0.959 0.838 -0.568 -0.447 0.121
(0.058) (0.006) (0.031) (0.058)*** (0.065)*** (0.031)***
0.173 0.453 0.278 -0.280 -0.105 0.175
(0.034) (0.052) (0.057) (0.061)*** (0.066) (0.076)**
0.483 0.634 0.397 -0.151 0.085 0.237
(0.041) (0.024) (0.035) (0.047)*** (0.054) (0.042)***
a Responses regarding construction materials used in rooms were included only for those households that reported 
information for all rooms. Standard errors clustered at cluster level shown in parentheses.  
*Significant at 10% level. **Significant at 5% level. ***Significant at 1% level  
Water in Terrain
Sink on Room where food is 
prepared 
Room where food is prepared 
is also used as Bedroom 
Electricity Connection inside 
the House
Use Gas Stove or Kerosene 
to Cook
House with Own Bathroom
Table A5. Differences in Pre-Treatment Means between countries. Housing 
Characteristics. Baseline Surveya
Number of Rooms
Share of Rooms with Good 
Quality Floors
Share of Rooms with Good  
Quality Walls
Share of Rooms with Good  
Quality Roofs
Share of Rooms with Window
